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The content of administered public school exams, modifications made
by a government to its voting machines, and the business strategies of
government corporations should be of interest to the public. At a min-
imum, they are the kinds of information that a government should
allow its citizens to see and examine. After all, the public might have
some legitimate questions for its government: Is that public school ex-
amination fair and accurate? Is that voting machine working so that
my vote gets counted? To whom or what is that government agency
marketing and are kickbacks involved? One would think that the gov-
ernment should have to publicly answer such questions, at least in a
democracy.
While initially the above does not sound too controversial, state law
has made it problematic. Getting access to the information that would
answer the above questions may not be easy because the person re-
questing the information may have to show that the information is not
a government trade secret before it can be disclosed. Today, the gov-
ernment of the people can keep information from the people by way of
the commercial, intellectual property law of trade secrecy. Strangely,
the people-citizens of states and the United States-apparently have
trade secrets that they themselves cannot see. In other words, there is
information that the government itself creates on its own (a "govern-
ment trade secret") and that courts and attorneys general have found
meet the applicable definition of a trade secret. This Article examines
whether a government trade secret should be allowed to exist and, if
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so, whether governments should be allowed to shield government trade
secrets from public disclosure.
Importantly, I am not focusing here on trade secrets shared with gov-
ernment by private industry or created by private industry on the public's
dime. That topic was the focus of an earlier article, Secrecy and Unac-
countability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure ("Secrecy").' In
Secrecy, I examined the question of whether private entities engaged in
the provision of public infrastructure, like voting machines and public
Wi-Fi Internet access, should be allowed to shield information regard-
ing their products and services from public disclosure by way of trade
secrecy. This is a question of applying democratic values like transpar-
ency and accountability to private entities, the practical effect of which
is in direct conflict with the purpose of trade secrecy, namely, keeping
commercial information private. I concluded that, as applied to public
infrastructure, trade secrecy should not be utilized by private entities
engaged in its provision.
While the conflict here is similar-transparency versus secrecy-the
policy considerations are quite different. For example: do we need to
incentivize innovation in government by way of trade secrecy? Should
the government be in the business of leveraging competitive advantage
in order to generate revenue or, much worse, for an unstated ulterior
motive like avoiding public scrutiny? If the government is allowed to
consider cost-effectiveness in its operations, should trade secrecy be
the mechanism that allows for this consideration? As the application of
trade secrecy by government is a very recent development (at least in
the United States) and there are very few reported decisions dealing
with the issue, its ramifications have yet to be explored in detail.
I examine these questions and issues by explaining how trade secrecy
and freedom of information laws interact, emphasizing the theoretical-
ly discordant nature of the government trade secret. In Part I, I
examine the basic issues involved in finding and maintaining a trade
secret. In Part II, I discuss several scenarios where government trade
secrets have been asserted with questionable basis in the law, such as a
county's modification of voting machines, or where government trade
secrecy has prevented the public from accessing valuable information,
such as a public school system's examinations and the minutes of pub-
lic corporation board meetings. Additionally, I posit reasons why the
1. David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public In-
frastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007) [hereinafter Secrecy]. The present Article builds on
Secrecy and a recently published book chapter, David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secre-
cy on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 442 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds.,
2011).
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problem of government trade secrets may be growing. In Part III, I out-
line the basic principles of transparency, accountability, and
democratic governance. In Part IV I discuss possible solutions to the
problems discussed, and conclude that trade secrecy is a poor fit in
government for two primary reasons: (a) the utilitarian basis for trade
secrecy does not fit well when applied to government, and (b) trans-
parency and accountability, two core democratic values, are severely
undermined when trade secrecy is used to prevent disclosure of other-
wise public information.
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INTRODUCTION
Hudson Mayor William Currin has called a special meeting of [the]
Council on June 22 at 7:30 p.m. in Town Hall to discuss "trade se-
crets and the purchase of property for public purposes." The
discussion will take place in executive session, which means it is
not open to the public. 2
An announcement of a town hall meeting is both commonplace and un-
exceptional. But this particular town hall meeting announcement illustrates
a problem that requires immediate attention. In fact, when the mayor of
Hudson, Ohio, announced this meeting, the announcement exemplified the
problem that is the focus of this Article. This meeting for the benefit of the
citizens of Hudson, Ohio, was not open to the public. It was not public be-
cause unstated and unidentified trade secrets would presumably be
discussed. However, the propriety of closing the meeting-of keeping this
information from the public-depends on whose trade secrets are going to
be discussed. On the one hand, if a private business's trade secrets would be
discussed, perhaps the private business should have the right to keep that
information from the public; else, it is no longer a trade secret. But if the
meeting would discuss, for example, spending taxpayer dollars to purchase
property, should the government have the power to say that information
about public expenditures is a trade secret-a "government trade secret"-
and therefore keep that information from the public?
This Article posits that the answer to the above question should and must
be "No" for two primary reasons. First, a "government trade secret" should be
a contradiction in terms because the existence of a government trade secret
conflicts with the policies underlying and purposes of trade secrecy. Second,
even where government trade secrets have been allowed to exist, democratic
values like transparency and accountability should eclipse whatever argu-
able economic benefit a government receives from maintaining the alleged
trade secret. Particularly in a democracy faced with the existence of enti-
ties dedicated to unmasking government secrets, like WikiLeaks, and the
Internet itself, which has vastly increased the ability to disseminate public
information,3 we need to guard against the tendency of governments to
avoid unwanted and potentially unfavorable scrutiny by unjustifiably fore-
closing disclosure of information. Thus, I argue that if the government is
going to prevent disclosure of data and information, it should find a much
better reason than the theoretically unjustified and concretely problematic
government trade secret.
2. Council to Discuss "Trade Secrets and the Purchase of Property" on Tuesday,
HUDSON HUB TIMES (June 18, 2010), http://www.hudsonhubtimes.com/news/article/
4846202.
3. See generally, David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Pro-
cess and "Black Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 811 (2011) (discussing the
impact of the Internet on government transparency and lawmaking).
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As discussed in this Article, this quandary has already manifested itself
in situations ranging from questions found in administered public school
examinations to the business strategies of the board of a public corporation
comprised of elected officials to modifications made by a government to
voting machines. In these scenarios and others discussed in this Article, the
same basic problem arises: the government's ability to assert trade secrecy
protection over information that it creates at public expense prevents the
public from knowing information with, at best, unclear and amorphous ben-
efits to the public derived from maintaining the secrecy. While this scenario
has already occurred and will continue to occur in increasing numbers if left
unaddressed, in the past two years a fundamental counter-position in gov-
ernment transparency has been articulated in the United States that suggests
that now is the time to address this problem.
During his first day as President of the United States, Barack Obama is-
sued a "memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies"
regarding the federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), the statute that
mandates open government with certain exemptions, one of which will be
discussed in detail in this Article.' In the first sentence of the memorandum,
President Obama noted that a "democracy requires accountability, and ac-
countability requires transparency." The memorandum went on to state that
FOIA "should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of
doubt, openness prevails." As part of the directive, President Obama ordered
the Attorney General to issue new FOIA guidelines and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget to "update guidance" to the agencies to effect his
directive.' The Attorney General issued his memorandum on March 19,
2009, in which he laid out two primary implications for how federal agen-
cies should respond to FOIA requests based upon President Obama's
memorandum: "First, an agency should not withhold information simply
because it may do so legally. . .. Second, whenever an agency determines
that it cannot make full disclosure of a requested record, it must consider
whether it can make a partial disclosure."6 As discussed in more detail be-
low, this is a fundamental reorientation of how agencies respond to FOIA
requests.
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") took a bit more time
to present its guidance to agencies, but it did so on December 8, 2009, in a
potentially groundbreaking way, issuing its Open Government Directive
4. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts &
Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/obamalfoia012109.pdf; Free-
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
5. Id.
6. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agen-
cies I (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf.
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(the "OMB Memorandum").' The OMB Memorandum requires federal
agencies to "take specific actions to implement the principles of transparen-
cy, participation, and collaboration" set forth in the President's
memorandum. This effort has been hailed optimistically as having the po-
tential to be a "watershed moment for democracy, the likes of which can
forever change the relationship between the government and the public it
serves."' Indeed, it has already resulted in agencies moving for the first time
towards releasing data on the Internet, making data available for download
for no charge, and disclosing previously unreleased documents for public
inspection. 9 In fact, every cabinet department is supposed to unveil a new
open government project.10
To understand the significance of these developments, it is important to
note the trend since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Commenta-
tors have found that, as a general matter, the United States government errs
on the side of secrecy, especially post-9/1 1." Moreover, there has been in-
creased use of the designation "Sensitive but Unclassified" by United States
government agencies. This designation, often found on research and scien-
tific or technological information generated by the government post-9/1 1,
allows the information to be withheld from public view.12 Thus, the OMB
Memorandum has the potential not only to begin to reverse post-9/1 I exces-
sive secrecy but also to allow for a re-imagination of the relationship
between government and its citizens at all levels, federal, state, and local.' 3
7. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/assets/memoranda_2010/mi0-06.pdf.
8. Ellen Miller, A Watershed Moment in Transparency and Accountability, THE SUN-
LIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:48 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/12/ll/
a-watershed-moment-in-transparency-and-accountability.
9. Miranda Fleschert, White House Announces 20 Agency Open Government Initia-
tives, THE REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Dec. 10, 2009, 3:50 PM), http://
www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=l 1165. For more recent information on the federal
government's mixed results in releasing data on the Internet, see David S. Levine, The Social
Layer of Freedom of Information Law, 90 N.C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
10. Norm Eisen & Beth Noveck, Why an Open Government Matters, OPEN Gov'T
INITIATIVE (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/09/why-open-
government-matters.
11. See Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons:
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1333, 1378
(2006). This does not always mean that information remains secret, but administrative errors
cannot form the basis of a disclosure regime. See lain Thomson, U.S. Army Posted Secrets on
the Web, V3.CO.UK (July 12, 2007), http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/1971520/us-army-
posted-secrets-web.
12. See GENEVIEVE KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33303 "SENSITIVE BUT
UNCLASSIFIED" INFORMATION AND OTHER CONTROLS: POLICY AND OPTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (2006) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
RL33303.pdf.
13. Unfortunately, the Obama administration has also taken positions in favor of se-
crecy that undermine optimism for fundamental change. See Andrew Malcolm, A Little
Secret About Obama's Transparency, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
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States can similarly embrace the idea of making their governments
more transparent and accountable by addressing the anomaly of the "gov-
ernment trade secret," which in most states allows the government to keep
from public view information created entirely by the government and desig-
nated as trade secrets by the government itself.'4 As the federal government
has practically dealt with this anomaly by exempting government from
FOIA's definition of a person, this Article seeks to lay the groundwork for
state legislatures to follow the lead of the federal government and the few
states that have addressed government trade secrets, and eliminate this un-
justified and ultimately unjustifiable hindrance to the release of significant
and valuable public information.
Historically, it has been axiomatic that the government's role is not pri-
marily to sell products to consumers, but rather to provide government
services. While agencies like the Department of Energy, the National Insti-
tutes of Health, and the Department of Agriculture develop new
technologies in conjunction with the private sector, the government has his-
torically facilitated, rather than created, intellectual property." To the extent
that the government develops intellectual property or contracts for its crea-
tion, the products developed have historically been for government use, as
opposed to the private sector's creation of products for consumers." But as
these practices change and governments become more direct commercial
actors, we should ask a basic question: should transparency and accounta-
bility give way to providing the most efficient and cheapest alternative to the
taxpayer?
From a broader perspective, as public and private interests blur and
governments and businesses partner, a reconsideration of the rules for
government is not only a good idea but a necessity." In Australia, which is
further along in this process than the United States, commentators have not-
ed that "an important consequence of the reconfiguring of government is
that a significant portion of the information generated and held by what is
left of the government sector is of a business nature," due to government
commercial activities or outsourcing of delivery of government services.'
2010/mar/21/nation/la-na-ticket2l-2010mar21 ("An Associated Press examination of 17
major agencies' handling of FOlA requests found denials 466,872 times, an increase of near-
ly 50% from the 2008 fiscal year under Bush.").
14. The federal government has addressed this anomaly in FOIA. See infra Part I.B.
15. David S. Bloch & James G. McEwen, "Other Transactions" with Uncle Sam: A
Solution to the High-Tech Government Contracting Crisis, 10 Tnx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195,
213-14 (2002). See also 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
16. Bloch & McEwen, supra note 15, at 195-96. The major and most high profile
exception to this general trend is the existence of prisoner-made products. See David Dish-
neau, Web Catalog Offers Prison-Made Products, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2006), available at
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/25/AR2006112500378.html.
17. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 191, for an extended discussion of these issues.
18. Moira Paterson, Commercial in Confidence and Public Accountability: Achieving
a New Balance in the Contract State, 32 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 315, 321 (2004).
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The "business nature" of information created by government, and whether
trade secrecy should protect it in the face of significant costs to the existence
of a transparent and accountable government, is the focus of this Article.
Despite its ramifications, this issue has received scant attention. There is
a total absence of explanation or discussion in the relevant trade secret mod-
el laws and statutes of the basis for, need for, and ramifications of allowing a
governmental entity to create and hold its own trade secrets. This absence is
understandable in light of the fact that the government trade secret appears
to be a nascent exemption from open government laws.'9 But ultimately, the
trend towards increased governmental commercial activity, like servicing
student loans and selling databases,2 0 combined with increasing budgetary
pressure on state and local governments to provide services at the lowest pos-
sible cost,21 means that one can expect governments to increasingly utilize
commercial law concepts like trade secrecy in their operations. This reality is
a force opposing the trend of transparency at the state level because some tra-
ditional operating principles of government, like transparency and
accountability, conflict with those of the private sector, like maintaining com-
mercial secrecy for competitive advantage. These opposing forces have been
largely unexplored in intellectual property literature, but such examination is
needed-including examination of whether trade secrecy belongs in this
sphere at all-before this practice becomes common in government and the
public uncritically accepts the role of government as a marketplace competi-
tor no different than Coca-Cola.
The early examples of trade secrecy application in government opera-
tions analyzed in this Article illustrate where the issues and solutions lie.
There are two concerns to address: first, whether government-generated
information can qualify as a trade secret under traditional definitions of
trade secrecy; and second, whether the government should be allowed to
assert trade secrecy even if certain of its information qualifies. This Article
takes on these issues from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Part I
addresses the first concern by exploring the basics of trade secrecy and free-
dom of information laws, and how these two areas of law interact,
emphasizing the theoretically discordant nature of a government trade se-
cret. In Part II, I discuss several scenarios in which government trade secrets
19. For a rare discussion of the government's commercial rights under FOIA, see
Steven W. Feldman, The Government's Commercial Data Privilege Under Exemption Five of
the Freedom of Information Act, 105 MIL. L. REV. 125 (1984). It is difficult to get a handle
on how often trade secrecy is utilized by governments, as there are few reported opinions
regarding its use and the issue can be raised in unpublished documents like responses to
Freedom of Information Act requests and sealed litigation. Assessing its prevalence will be a
focus of future work.
20. See infra Part Ill.
21. Michael A. Fletcher, States Seek Financial Help as New Fiscal Year Begins, WASH.
PosT (July 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/
AR2010063005355.html.
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have been asserted with little or no basis in the theoretical underpinnings of
the law, such as a county's modification of voting machines, and where
government trade secrecy has prevented the public from accessing valuable
information, such as a public school system's examinations. Additionally, I
posit that the use of government trade secrets is likely to increase. Part [11
addresses the second concern by considering governmental use of trade se-
crecy against the background principles of transparency, accountability, and
democratic governance. In Part IV, I discuss possible solutions to the prob-
lems discussed, and Part V concludes that the best solution is to eliminate
the concept of the government trade secret.
I. THE RELEVANT LAW
There are two basic laws that need to be understood in order to assess
the cases discussed in Part II: trade secrecy and freedom of information.
A. Trade Secrecy
As discussed at length in Secrecy, trade secrecy, by its very name, in-
vokes two core interests: secrecy and commerce.2 2 It is a singularly
commercial doctrine designed to protect private commercial interests by
allowing companies and individuals to keep secret for a potentially
unlimited time those formulas, processes, and inventions that afford them
pecuniary gain.23 Trade secrecy is a state law doctrine, and the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), which has been adopted in 45 states and the
District of Columbia,24 defines a trade secret as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.25
The paradigmatic example of a trade secret is the "secret combination of
flavoring oils and ingredients known as 'Merchandise 7X,'" the formula for
22. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 136.
23. As the seminal definition of trade secrets found in the Restatement (First) of Torts
("Torts Restatement") states, "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 4 RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
24. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 71 table of jurisdictions wherein act has
been adopted (1985).
25. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 1(4) (1985) (emphasis added). The itali-
cized terms are those that are problematic when used in connection with governments.
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Coca-Cola. The formula, which is not patented, is the most famous example
of a trade secret, and it has existed as a trade secret for over 100 years.2 6
Given that a formula for a soft drink is the trade secret paradigm, it should
not come as a surprise that neither the restatement nor UTSA appear to have
been written with application to governments in mind; rather, unfair compe-
tition between private actors is its singular focus.27 But, as discussed below
and in Secrecy, most states' expansive interpretation of the application of
trade secrecy law allows governments to assert trade secrecy.
As I discussed in Secrecy,2 8 not all states and courts endorse govern-
ment trade secrets, although those that do not are currently in the severe
minority. For example, in 1983, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
held that a "trade secret contention ceases to be of any moment when the
function is recognized as governmental, rather than that of a private busi-
ness."29 Nonetheless, despite the seemingly divergent paradigms of private
commercial competition through secrecy and the public transparency sought
from democratic government, commentators like Professor Richard Epstein
have taken a different position than that of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court.30 Epstein has asserted that "government has the same right as pri-
vate parties to classify information." He argues that so long as government
meets the relevant standard to establish a trade secret, it should be able to
avail itself of that protection and seek "injunctive relief to prevent that
information from slipping into hostile hands." Moreover, the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition includes governments in a list of non-
business organizations that can hold trade secrets, but does not explain
why trade secrets are appropriate for governments, and only mentions
examples of trade secrets held by non-profit 31 and charitable organiza-
26. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985).
Noting the efforts that Coca-Cola has undertaken to protect its secret, the court explained
that the formula "has been tightly guarded since Coca-Cola was first invented and is known
by only two persons within The Coca-Cola Company" and that the "only written record of
the secret formula is kept in a security vault at the Trust Company Bank in Atlanta, Georgia,
which can only be opened upon a resolution from the Company's Board of Directors." Id.
27. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 147.
28. Id. at 163.
29. Hoffman v. Pennsylvania, 455 A.2d 731, 733 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
30. Richard A. Epstein, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1003, 1044 (2000). How that would play out is difficult to imagine, and I have been
unable to find any reported cases where the government has brought an action alleging trade
secret misappropriation.
31. A line of California federal court cases have held that a non-profit organization, in
these cases the Church of Scientology, could hold trade secrets if it met California's statutory
requirements. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting
that the court had previously held that the Church's "scriptures" were not trade secrets be-
cause the Church had not alleged any commercial value assigned to them); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., No. C-95-20091 RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23572, at *42 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (in entering a preliminary injunction against the disclo-
sure of certain Church trade secrets, noting that it is difficult to identify "potential
competitors" of the Church for purposes of the public knowledge element of the definition of
[Vol. 18:61
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tions.3 2 Additionally, the UTSA definition of "persons" subject to trade secret
protection includes governments and governmental subdivisions and agen-
cies, again without any analysis or commentary.33 The law has generally
followed the restatement approach: the Ohio Revised Code, typical of most
states' laws regarding trade secrets, defines a "person" covered by Ohio's
Uniform Trade Secrets Act as including government entities. 34
Superficially, a government trade secret seems fine; after all, it might al-
low for greater efficiency in government operations or lower costs to the
public for goods and services. But notwithstanding the current state of the
law, which was created with little analysis of what a government trade se-
cret would actually be, the core theoretical moorings of trade secrecy do not
support the existence of government trade secrets.
1. Trade Secrecy Theory
Scholars have long debated the theoretical underpinnings of trade secret
law." The utilitarian theory of trade secrecy, variations of which undergird
most of intellectual property law, posits that protecting against misappropri-
ation or theft of a trade secret encourages investment, innovation, and
efficient dissemination of information along supply chains. This can be, and
often is, tied to the notion that a trade secret is a form of property.
The utilitarian theory is the most prominent of the theoretical bases that
anchor trade secrecy law. The major alternate theory focuses on misappro-
priation of trade secrets and deterring bad acts, suggesting a tort-based
theory of trade secrecy that encourages fair competition and ethical business
practices and punishes bad acts. 6 This, of course, leads us into the unfair
a trade secret); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 633-34 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(holding that the Church's "Advanced Technology" spiritual materials met the California
statutory definition of a trade secret because, among other reasons, the Church "use[d] pro-
ceeds from the sale of these materials . . . to support the operations" of the Church).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995) (noting that
"lists of prospective members and donors" are examples of "economically valuable infor-
mation" that a charity might have as a trade secret).
33. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 1(3) (1985).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61(C) (2005). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(c)
(2011) (" 'Person' means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partner-
ship, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-
152(2) (2011) ("'Person' means an individual, corporation, government, governmental sub-
division or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, or any
other legal or commercial entity."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2(3) ("'Person' means a natu-
ral person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture,
government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.").
35. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secret Rights as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REv. 311, 312 n.3 (2008).
36. As Lemley points out in The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, "[a]lthough under the tort theory trade secret protection is not explicitly about en-
couraging investments, it is plain that one consequence of deterring wrongful behavior
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competition realm, itself a potentially separate space (at least by restatement
standards) from pure torts. This ongoing debate about trade secrecy's theo-
retical underpinnings has lead Professor Robert Bone to pen an influential
article in this area bluntly titled A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine
in Search of Justification.37
While the question of which (if any) theoretical justifications support
the existence of trade secrecy is beyond the scope of this Article, the debate
about what should be the governing theory of trade secrecy makes it a doc-
trine prone to misapplication and misuse. Perhaps the most persuasive
recent article to take on the theoretical question is Professor Mark Lemley's
The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, which argues
that the proper theoretical alignment of trade secrecy is with the utilitarian
theory of intellectual property.38 But trade secrecy applied to government-
created information inverts the very theoretical bases that Lemley uses to
support his argument. Put simply, governments do not appear to be spurred
to innovate because they have trade secrecy protection. Rather, trade secrecy
operates primarily as an exemption from disclosure of information under
state freedom of information laws. Because the utilitarian theory does not
adequately explain the need for government trade secrets, Lemley's defense
of commercial trade secrecy based upon the utilitarian theory underscores
the mismatch of governments and trade secrets.39
Lemley argues that, in sum, "trade secrets can be justified as a form, not
of traditional property, but of intellectual property (IP). The incentive justifi-
cation for encouraging new inventions is straightforward. Granting legal
protection for those new inventions not only encourages their creation, but
enables an inventor to sell her idea."40 This justification is far from "straight-
forward" when applied to governments. From the outset, this motivation is
would be to encourage investment in trade secrets. Hence, despite their conceptual differ-
ences, the tort and property/incentive approaches to trade secrets may well push in the same
direction in many respects." Id. at 319-20. Thus, although other considerations may come
into play, both major theories share the common thread of encouraging investment as their
reason for being. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (West,
Westlaw through 2011 legislation), which created federal criminal liability for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, further amplifies the tension between the property and tort-based theo-
theories of trade secrecy protection.
37. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustifica-
tion, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241 (1998).
38. Lemley, supra note 35.
39. While beyond the scope of this Article, I have argued in Secrecy that the entire
history of trade secrecy law is built around the basic notion of protecting secret information
that has private commercial value and in that way encouraging private innovation. See Secre-
cy, supra note 1, at 147. Treating trade secrecy as an IP right puts the element of actually
having a secret as the first consideration, whereas treating it as a tort does not. See Lemley,
supra note 35, at 342-45. 1 tend to agree with Lemley's position that treating trade secrecy as
an IP right is the most internally consistent and logical position. Thus, I analyze this problem
through the utilitarian prism.
40. Lemley, supra note 35, at 313.
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almost completely irrelevant to governments: as discussed more fully below,
governments need no incentive from the market to serve the public, and sell-
ing a product (and generating a profit) is not the primary reason that
governments exist, even where a particular governmental entity competes
with the private sector. Perhaps the reason that there are so few cases involv-
ing government trade secrets-and almost all of those cases arise in the
freedom of information context-is precisely because the doctrine has not
operated as an incentive for innovation within government.4
Lemley goes on to argue that the existence of trade secrecy law actually
encourages disclosure rather than secrecy, noting that "without legal
protection, companies in certain industries would invest too much in keep-
ing secrets. Trade secret law develops as a substitute for the physical and
contractual restrictions those companies would otherwise impose in an
effort to prevent competitors from acquiring their information."4 2 Again,
governments do not fit into this analysis and in fact invert it, since trade
secrecy does not serve this purpose in the government context. Business-
es, unlike government, do not operate under a presumption of openness;
thus, because businesses are allowed to keep many secrets, trade secrecy
law may very well serve the disclosure function that Lemley identified.
In the government context, however, the default is openness and disclo-
sure of public records unless a statutory exemption in FOIA or other law
prevents public dissemination. While trade secrecy theoretically might help
taxpayers obtain the most cost-efficient government possible, other signifi-
cant values in direct conflict with trade secrecy, like transparency and
accountability, have even stronger moorings.43 Lemley's justification under-
scores the theoretical disconnect of a government trade secret, as trade
secrecy is primarily used as an exemption from state freedom of information
laws that encourage and mandate disclosure of public records unless an ex-
emption applies.' In other words, if the information sought to be disclosed
by the government is deemed a government trade secret, such designation
will be unlikely to encourage more goods and services including trade se-
crets to be developed by government; rather, it will only mean that less
41. I could not find any evidence that trade secrecy has operated as an incentive to
innovate within government agencies. For example, while not conclusive evidence, a Google
search performed on September 15, 2011, for the phrase "government trade secret" yielded
no hits involving a government trade secret as defined herein other than my own work. One
would expect that if trade secrecy were serving utilitarian goals in government, there might
be a few reported decisions where government affirmatively asserted trade secrets in situa-
tions other than the freedom of information context, such as a basis for a misappropriation
action. It is beyond the scope of this Article to identify empirical evidence of the use of trade
secrecy as an incentive to innovation in government, but I intend to examine this question in
future research, not surprisingly, by way of FOIA requests.
42. Lemley, supra note 35, at 342-45.
43. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 158-62 for a discussion of the history of transparen-
cy as a value in democratic government.
44. See infra Part LB.
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information will be disclosed since the government trade secret will be ex-
empt from disclosure. There is no direct evidence that state governments are
incentivized to serve the public by the availability of trade secrecy protec-
tion or that they license their trade secrets. Thus, in the government context,
trade secrecy does the exact opposite of Lemley's supposition-it allows for
more secrecy and less disclosure-and does not appear to encourage any
more government innovation than would otherwise exist.
2. The UTSA
In fact, by looking at the basic definitions found in the UTSA, we can
press this analysis a bit further to illustrate how mismatched trade secrecy is
in the government context. For example, applying basic elements of what
constitutes a trade secret to government information, especially the require-
ment that reasonable efforts be made to protect the secret,45 would by
definition undoubtedly encourage more secrecy even where the default is
transparency. Because trade secrecy operates primarily as a defensive shield
to disclosure under freedom of information laws and is apparently viewed as
such by some governmental entities and courts, a government trade secret
has no significant practical connection to any of the underlying theories for
trade secrets' existence generally. To the extent that government trade se-
crets have been asserted, they have always been used as a shield to public
disclosure of the alleged trade secrets, rather than a sword in a misappropri-
ation action.4 6
Governments have not brought affirmative trade secret misappropriation
claims for good reason: so far, they don't appear to use trade secrecy law in
that manner, nor can they.47 The UTSA defines misappropriation as
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows
or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improp-
er means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used im-
proper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the
time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
45. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT, 14 U.L.A. 1(4)(ii) (1985).
46. The clearest possible exception to this trend appears to be the reference to gov-
ernment modifications of voting machines by the City of San Diego, discussed infra Part
II.D(1). Because this example is found in a contract, rather than a scenario in which a third
party sought information from the government and was denied, the use of government trade
secrecy as a sword is, as of now, speculative but possible.
47. Although, as discussed above, there is nothing in model or state laws that would
prevent governments from doing so other than the perplexing questions of what a govern-
ment trade secret misappropriation claim would look like and why such a claim would be
brought given the existence of other more plausible causes of action, like unfair competition,
unjust enrichment, or even criminal prosecution. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 344-45. 1
argue in Part Ill that we do not want to encourage government to engage trade secrecy pre-
cisely because it flies in the face of transparency and accountability. See infra Part Ill.
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knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a
person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired
under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a
duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew
or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge
of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 48
The UTSA envisions misappropriation to constitute actions by individuals
or entities that generally use "improper means" or act in breach of confi-
dence. Therefore, how could the public (as opposed to a former government
employee) seeking public information misappropriate a government trade
secret? It seems particularly illogical for the public as a whole to be viewed
as "a person" having misappropriated information from a public entity, es-
pecially where that information relates to the activities of that public entity.
As the public is ultimately the owner of the information itself, it appears
impossible that it could misappropriate its own information. Simply, one
cannot misappropriate from oneself.4 9
3. The Impact of the Theoretical and Practical Disconnect:
The Government Trade Secret
The malleability of trade secrecy theory is perhaps its fundamental
weakness as a doctrine, and the existence of government trade secrets is one
of the unfortunate outcomes of this nebulousness. Notwithstanding (and
perhaps because of) the existence of a doctrine with debatable theoretical
underpinnings, as discussed in the following Part, courts are finding gov-
ernment trade secrets with, it appears, little or no analysis regarding why or
how the government can have or need a trade secret. This is perhaps un-
derstandable because trade secrecy is still very much in search of a
uniformly accepted and applied justification. Therefore, it is arguably
more malleable-and prone to abuseso-than its more theoretically
grounded and constitutionally based intellectual property brethren, espe-
cially copyright and patent.5' Lemley has made a similar observation with
48. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 14 U.L.A. 1(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
49. This argument is amplified in Part Ill.B, infra, which discusses the agency theory
of transparency, as well as Part I.C, infra, which discusses another problematic aspect of the
UTSA in the context of public school examinations.
50. See infra Part II. Of course, as more industries assert robust intellectual property
rights, it is not surprising that governments might jump on the bandwagon and assert a right
where a uniformly accepted and strong theoretical objection is absent.
51. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Those brethren, particularly copyright and patent,
also have express rules regarding their application to government. See 537 C.F.R. § 404.1(b)
(2011) (discussing patent rules); Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 5, http://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circl.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (discussing copyright rules).
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reference to traditional trade secrecy litigation by lamenting courts' diffi-
culty in finding a strong IP-based theoretical underpinning for trade secrecy:
Courts have departed from the principle of trade secrets as IP
rights.... Doing so risks turning trade secrets from a well-defined
legal right that serves the broader purposes of IP law into a stand-
ardless, free-roaming right to sue competitors for business conduct
that courts or juries might be persuaded to deem objectionable.52
As seen in Part II, in the context of government trade secrets, Lemley's
fear of a "standardless, free-roaming right" has already come to pass.
However, we do have at least one example of a court actually applying the
utilitarian theory of trade secrecy to this scenario and thereby revealing
the theoretical absurdity of a government trade secret. When considering
the fundamental difference between the reasons that a government might
wish to keep information secret-for example, to protect the security of
the nation-and a business's trade-based and profit-oriented reasons, the
Ohio Supreme Court focused on a utilitarian analysis. With reference to the
competitive position of the governmental entity, the court noted that
[r]espondents cite no authority, however, holding that a public of-
fice can even have its own protected trade secrets . . . . [T]his court
has held that the fact that disclosure of information will result in a
competitive disadvantage to the public institution is not grounds for
preventing disclosure . . . . The protection of competitive advantage
in private, not public, business underpins trade secret law.
Underscoring the need for this Article, this decision was subsequently su-
perseded by a UTSA-based statute that now allows governments to hold
trade secrets.54
52. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 342-43 (noting several cases, including the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Dravo Corp., where courts have misconstrued the purpose of
trade secrecy law leading to undesirable results).
53. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found., 602 N.E.2d 1159, 1163-
64 (Ohio 1992) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), superseded by statute as stated in
State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 721 N.E.2d 1044, 1049-50 (Ohio 2000) (finding that
Ohio UTSA now allows for governments to have trade secrets and noting that other jurisdic-
tions, including Florida and Washington, also allow public entities to have trade secrets). In
the context of the University of Toledo's argument that release of the requested documents
would lead to a competitive disadvantage, Toledo Blade Co., supra, cited State ex rel. Fox v.
Cuyahoga County Hospital System, 529 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ohio 1988) for the proposition
that "[n]o pleading of too much expense, or too much time involved, or too much interfer-
ence with normal duties, can be used by [the University of Toledo] to evade the public's right
to inspect and obtain a copy of public records within a reasonable time." Thus, the court took
a very dim view of the notion that the relative competitive position of a governmental entity
should trump the disclosure of public records. Id.
54. This statutory change does not automatically mean that the government can main-
tain a trade secret. See State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 747 N.E.2d
255, 259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (applying the Ohio UTSA and Besser, 721 N.E.2d at 1049-
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Nonetheless, the persuasiveness of Toledo Blade's argument remains.
As the Ohio Supreme Court decision explains, public institutions like uni-
versities simply should not engage the same goals or motivations as private
sector entities. There is little utilitarian basis for trade secrecy when the enti-
ties receiving the incentive are governments that will create based upon
legislative mandate, court order, or the perceived needs of the people, not
because they may marginally benefit from trade secrecy protection and earn
more profit. But the fact that Ohio subsequently discarded this distinction in
adopting the UTSA with no apparent analysis of the impact of this change
further suggests that trade secrecy remains on shaky theoretical ground even
as the utilitarian theory is advanced.
There is no straightforward, clear, or complete utilitarian basis for the
existence of a government trade secret. Moreover, as the UTSA and re-
statements illustrate, trade secrecy law was not designed with governments
in mind. Nonetheless, because states and courts fail to identify any trade
secrecy-based rationale for having, or not having, a government trade secret,
the debate about the theoretical basis for trade secrecy remains critically
important. Because there is no one unified theory of trade secrecy, a court
can, if it wishes, pick and choose the theoretical rationale for its conclusion.
As discussed above, the choice of a theoretical basis (or absence of a
choice) impacts the conclusions reached.
Thus, as courts have occasionally been confronted with the oddity of a
government trade secret, and as courts will likely see more such claims in
the future (if the below recent examples suggest a trend, which I believe
they do),55 a clear understanding of this theoretical incongruity is crucial to
getting the right result-that is, one that abhors a government trade secret as
theoretically unjustifiable. Firmly explaining the lack of a connection be-
tween trade secrecy and traditional notions of democratic governance
requires that the court (a) understand the primary utilitarian basis for trade
secrecy's existence, and (b) as discussed in Parts II and III, look outside
trade secrecy doctrine to conclude that the government trade secret unjusti-
fiably stands in the way of government transparency and accountability.
B. Trade Secrecy and Federal and State
Freedom of Information Laws
So far, I've addressed a basic question: why are we allowing governments
to have trade secrets? To address that question, two problems regarding the
nature of trade secret doctrine have been identified: (1) although the utilitarian
theory is perhaps the most sound justification for trade secrecy, trade secrecy
150, and finding no basis for trade secret protection of the names, applications, and resumes
of people who applied for a position with the Dayton Board of Education, because the court
did not see "what independent economic value the ... information has or how other private
persons could reap some economic benefit from having it").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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is prone to potential abuse because it lacks a strong theoretical foundation
that is widely accepted by courts, and (2) as a result, odd permutations can
arise that appear to have limited or no connection to any theoretical or statu-
tory basis for the doctrine. The odd permutations are increasingly and
primarily occurring in the context of freedom of information requests made
to a governmental entity. Therefore, understanding the complex intersection
of trade secrecy and freedom of information laws is critical to analyzing this
problem and the following examples.
As discussed above, I posit that the courts should not even get to the
point of applying a government trade secrecy exemption to freedom of in-
formation laws since trade secrecy was not created with governments in
mind and the concept of a governmental trade secret is theoretically and
practically problematic. To show the practical effects of this theoretical co-
nundrum, it is important to understand the basics of how the trade secrecy
exemption to freedom of information laws operates at the federal and state
level. All of the examples discussed below could or do involve variations on
one basic theme: use of a trade secret exemption in a state's freedom of in-
formation law to prevent disclosure of government-created trade secrets. As
the below examples indicate, FOIA may get this right (albeit for definitional
as opposed to theoretical reasons), whereas state governments too often are
deciding against transparency. While it may be tempting to simply accept
FOIA's interpretation and move on, examining why FOIA gets it right re-
veals the depth of the problem for the great majority of states that do not
share its view.
FOIA, enacted in 1966 as a result of increased interest in allowing in-
vestigative journalism, 5 6 is designed to force disclosure and "permit access
to official information long shielded from public view"" by permitting any
citizen or business to request information from the federal government by
way of a FOIA request." Indeed, "[flew aspects of government-citizen rela-
tions are more central to the responsible operation of a representative
democracy than the citizen's ability to monitor governmental operations.
Critical in this regard is the existence of a general individual right of access
to government-held information."59
FOIA can be the avenue for journalists and private citizens alike to dis-
cover exactly what the government is doing. In the wake of FOIA and a few
other significant events of the 1960s, "major media . . . began accepting 'a
duty to report beyond the superficial handouts from those with social and
56. Christopher J. Lewis, When Is A Trade Secret Not So Secret? The Deficiencies of
40 C.ER. Part 2, Subpart B, 30 ENVTL. L. 143, 153 (2000).
57. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973); see also Dep't of the Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
58. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280, 1289
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
59. Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 971
(1975).
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political power."' 0 Any impediment to the operation of FOIA can have dev-
astating effects on the ability of citizens to accurately analyze and critique
the activities of government.
Notwithstanding the goal of transparency, FOIA recognizes that some
information in the possession of government should be kept from public
disclosure. FOIA includes a number of exemptions from disclosure, includ-
ing those for certain documents and information regarding national defense,
foreign policy,'' law enforcement, 62 and, as determined by the federal agen-
cy holding the information, commercial trade secrets.63 As explained by the
Supreme Court, Congress felt the need for a trade secret exemption because
"with the expanding sphere of government regulation and enterprise, much
of the information within [government] files has been submitted by private
entities seeking [government] contracts or responding to unconditional re-
porting obligations imposed by law."' Martin Halstuk notes that "[fWederal
agencies persuaded Congress that government-regulated businesses-such
as drug manufacturers, food producers, and telecommunications firms-
needed assurances that the proprietary and confidential business information
they were required to submit to federal agencies would be protected."65 The
FOIA trade secret exemption further establishes that trade secrecy is de-
signed and conceived with private industry in mind, not governments.
Despite an exemption for trade secrets, 66 FOIA effectively orients gov-
ernment away from secrecy by setting a default of disclosure unless an
exemption applies. This orientation is the opposite of trade secrecy, which
limits disclosure except in narrow circumstances. As such, under FOIA, the
government may not use the trade secret exemption for information generat-
ed by the government itself. The trade secrets exemption only applies to
information that is "obtained from a person" by the governmental entity.67 In
construing the statutory phrase "obtained from a person," courts have con-
cluded that the government is not a "person" for purposes of FOIA. Thus, as
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found in Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, the exemption does not
60. Carl Sessions Stepp, Is Investigative Reporting Here to Stay?, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Dec. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 67, 67 (reviewing and quoting JAMES L. AucoIN, THE EvOLU-
TION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 66 (2006)).
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2005).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
64. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
65. Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the Open Govern-
ment Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 440 (2008).
66. See Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights v. Food & Drug Admin., No. CV 92-5313,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21369, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 1993) ("[T]he documents which are
part of the Prozac New Drug Application that have been withheld by the FDA are exempt
from disclosure because they contain trade secrets . . . ."), aff'd in part and remanded in part
on other grounds, 45 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1995).
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
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apply to information generated by the federal government itself, and is lim-
ited primarily to documents prepared by the federal government that contain
summaries or reformulations of information supplied by a source outside
the government. 68
Moreover, when courts apply the trade secrets FOIA exemption to a
proper entity, like a private company that submits an alleged trade secret to a
federal agency, utilizing a broad commercial definition of a trade secret is
inappropriate. Particularly because the focus in such cases is public values
such as disclosure of information through transparency, narrowly tailoring
the definition of a trade secret is a good idea. For example, in rejecting the
use of the Restatement of Torts definition of a trade secret 9 in FOIA's
commercial trade secrets disclosure exemption,70 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained:
[T]he [Restatement of Torts] definition, tailored as it is to protecting
businesses from breaches of contract and confidence by departing
employees and others under fiduciary obligations[,] is ill-suited for
the public law context in which FOIA determinations must be
made.. .. The common law definition was tailored to private con-
texts where public policy almost exclusively focuses on the unjust
enrichment and competitive harm resulting when someone acquires
a business intangible through the breach of a contract or a confiden-
tial relationship. . . . The Restatement approach, with its emphasis
on culpability and misappropriation, is ill-equipped to strike an ap-
propriate balance between the competing interests of regulated
industries and the general public."
Thus, the court chose a narrower definition of trade secret that allowed the
disclosure of "health and safety data" regarding intraocular lenses submitted
by regulated companies to the United States Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), despite the trade secrets exemption to FOIA.72 The restrictive def-
inition "incorporated a direct relationship between the information at issue
and the productive process"-again, applying the utilitarian basis for trade
secrecy's existence-thereby properly balanced public and private interests
by allowing the disclosure of information deemed to be worthy of disclosure
68. See Gulf& Western Indus. v. U.S., 615 F.2d 527, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
69. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
71. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280, 1289
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 1290. Commentators have expressed concerns regarding the government's
ability to disclose, either accidentally or purposefully, commercial trade secrets that it con-
trols because of its regulatory, contracting, and licensing capabilities. See generally Stephen
R. Wilson, Public Disclosure Policies: Can a Company Still Protect Its Trade Secrets?, 38
NEw ENG. L. REV. 265 (2004) (discussing whistleblower protection and other laws that en-
courage public disclosure of commercial information, often over concerns regarding trade
secrecy).
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in the public interest and under the intent of FOIA. 3 The tailoring of the
trade secret definition to its context will be explored in more detail in Part
IV, but Gulf & Western" underscores the notion that when courts confront
trade secrecy in the freedom of information context (much less in the con-
text of a government trade secret), they must consider its theoretical
underpinnings in order to apply it properly and accommodate the core val-
ues of transparency and accountability."
Unfortunately, states appear to almost uniformly take a different ap-
proach that allows government trade secrets and ignores the theoretical
disconnect. Significantly, few state courts have confronted this issue, and I
have yet to find any state legislature that reported considering the possibility
of a government trade secret in passing its trade secret law. But, among oth-
er reasons discussed in Part II, because most states follow the UTSA, it
appears likely that state legislatures may have unwittingly allowed their
governments to claim trade secrecy as an exemption to disclosure under
their state freedom of information laws.76 The Ohio example," which allows
a government trade secret, seems the most likely outcome under most states'
laws.
A notable exception to the scenarios discussed in Part II, and one that
should be a model for other states' freedom of information laws, appears in
a recent opinion of Connecticut's Freedom of Information Commission
("CT Commission")." In Pelto v. Connecticut, the complainant sought a
73. Pub. Citizen, 704 F2d at 1287-88 (adopting a definition of a trade secret, for pur-
poses of FOIA, "as a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort"); see also Dianna G. Gold-
enson, FOIA Exemption Five: Will ft Protect Government Scientists from Unfair Intrusion?, 29
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 330-31 (2002) (noting the difficulties that government scientists
face of "unfair intrusion into their scientific process-an intrusion not suffered by scientists in
the private sector because those individuals are not vulnerable to disclosure under FOIA").
74. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
75. The very existence of a trade secret definition designed specifically for FOIA sug-
gests that the usual commercial definition is inappropriately applied to entities that operate in
the governmental or public infrastructure spheres.
76. Indeed, one commentator has noted that most state freedom of information laws
contain no explicit statement of purpose. See John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Cop-
yright, 1989 Wisc. L. REv. 1021, 1028 (1989). While the absence of a statement of purpose
makes predicting the outcome even more difficult, it is important to emphasize that because
most state courts have not confronted the issue of a government trade secret, it is impossible
to say definitively how all fifty states would come out if confronted with this scenario. The
purpose of this Article is to make their analysis simpler when that day comes.
77. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61 (2005).
78. Pelto v. Connecticut, No. FIC 2008-341 (Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm'n
May 13, 2009) (final decision), available at http://www.state.ct.us/foi/2009FD/
20090513/FIC2008-341.htm; see also Ryan M. Ingram, Must Government Contractors
"Submit" to Their Own Destruction?: Georgia's Trade Secret Disclosure Exemption and
United Healthcare of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 60 MERCER
L. REV. 825, 832 (2009) (noting that "trade secrets of government agencies themselves are
not exempt from disclosure" under Georgia's open government laws).
Fall 2011] 81
82 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
variety of records from the University of Connecticut ("UC"). With regard
to requested lists of athletic event ticket purchasers and prospects, the CT
Commission noted that
[UC] claimed that such records are customer lists and therefore ex-
empt from mandatory disclosure as trade secrets, pursuant to
[Connecticut's freedom of information law]. [UC] also contended
that such customer lists "derive independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons" like the
complainant who "can obtain economic value from" the disclosure
or use of the respondent's customer list. Additionally, [UC] con-
tended that it has taken reasonable efforts under the circumstances
to maintain the secrecy of [relevant] databases.79
After noting that the CT Commission had never confronted the question
of whether the trade secrets exemption "applies to records that a public
agency asserts are its own trade secrets, rather than the trade secrets of pri-
vate entities submitted to or filed with the agency," the CT Commission
rejected UC's arguments by performing a textual analysis of the word
"trade."so Specifically, it noted the differing goals of the public and private
sectors and ultimately applied a utilitarian trade secrecy theory:
The Commission takes administrative notice of the fact that public
agencies are generally engaged in governance, not trade. . .. The
Commission also takes administrative notice of the fact that the
principal function of the [UC] is not trade, but rather education, a
traditional governmental function. .. . Unlike a private business en-
tity engaged in "trade" where profits are closely linked to such
entities' existence and economic advantage, the cultural and athletic
activities of the [UC] are incidental to its primary governmental
function of education. It is also found that the [UC] is largely sub-
sidized by public funding, unlike a private business engaged in
trade that depends on earned income for its continued existence.8 '
This analysis, like that of the Ohio Supreme Court in Toledo Blade,82 is
based on a utilitarian theory of trade secrecy suggesting the absence of a
need for government trade secrets. The analysis resulted in the CT Commis-
sion finding that the records were not customer lists or trade secrets under
79. Pelto, No. FIC 2008-341 at % 32.
80. Id. at 138 (noting that Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) defines "trade" in
relevant part as: "The business of buying and selling or bartering goods or services .... A
transaction or swap . . . . A business or industry occupation; a craft or profession.").
81. Id. at IT 39-41, 47. This analysis suggests a proposed solution to the problem,
discussed in Part IV, infra.
82. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found., 602 N.E.2d 1159, 1163-
64 (Ohio 1992).
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Connecticut law and ordering their disclosure to the complainant." Placed
in its utilitarian context, the CT Commission was effectively saying that
UC does not need a trade secret incentive to engage in its primary func-
tion, education. Unlike a profit-making entity that relies on income for its
survival, UC is not in the "trade" of conducting athletic events, and the
existence of such events is not closely linked to its mission as a public
educational institution.
The laudable utilitarian stance of the CT Commission seems to be the
severe outlier in the face of the examples discussed in Part II. Nonetheless,
it harbingers the faint possibility of a counter-trend that might begin to re-
verse the pattern that seems to be emerging in which courts, and
governments themselves, find that trade secrecy can be a successful weapon
against disclosure of information that would otherwise have to be disclosed
under a state's freedom of information law.84 Such a counter-trend currently
faces an uphill battle. Even at the more open federal level, the statutory ex-
emptions to FOIA remain in place. At the end of the OMB Memorandum,
its author, OMB Director Peter Orszag, reminds the reader that "nothing in
this Directive shall be construed to suggest that the presumption of openness
precludes the legitimate protection of information whose release would
threaten national security, invade personal privacy, breach confidentiality, or
damage other genuinely compelling interests."85 Thus there is a lot of
wiggle room for the government to find information exempt from disclosure
and little apparent political interest or motivation to change the standard.
Although I encourage states' governors to follow the President's charge
and issue their own open government directives, few states have adopted a
similar formal mandate. Especially in the absence of an executive mandate,
the government trade secret problem risks becoming slowly but increasingly
entrenched at the state level. Moreover, as pressure mounts to provide
83. Unfortunately, the Connecticut Superior Court overturned the Commission's deci-
sion and said that the University of Connecticut could create a trade secrets exemption from
public disclosure under Connecticut state law. See Univ. of Conn. v. Freedom of Info.
Comm'n, No. HHBCV094021320S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 996 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
21, 2010). The court based its analysis on precisely the problems discussed above: Connecti-
cut freedom of information law defines a "person" as including the government and the
standard definition of a trade secret is broad enough to include a variety of information. Id. at
*22-24. The decision is pending appeal. UConn Fights to Keep Donor List, CBS N.Y. (Feb.
13, 2011, 5:11 AM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/13/uconn-fights-to-keep-donor-
list-secret. Nonetheless, the persuasiveness of the administrative decision remains.
84. See State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 747 N.E.2d 255, 259
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
85. Orszag, supra note 7, at 6. Indeed, the trend, if any, is in favor of more trade se-
crecy. A recently proposed FOIA rule change from the United States Department of Justice
regarding its handling of FOIA requests would make it easier for private entities to claim the
trade secret exemption under FOIA. See John Wonderlich, Obama's DOJ Seeks to Weaken
the FOJA, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2011, 5:36 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/
blog/2011/10/28/obamas-doj-seeks-to-weaken-the-foia/?utm source=feedbumer&utmmedium
= feed& utm _campaign=Feed%3A+SunlightNews+%28Sunlight+News%29.
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government services on smaller budgets and the trend of outsourcing gov-
ernment services continues, trade secrecy may play a more prominent role
in the creation of government services. This trend would have a significant
impact on public disclosure because the trade secret exemption to disclosure
is often the government's last resort argument. In every case discussed be-
low in which a state freedom of information law was involved, were there
no such beast as a government trade secret, the subject information would
likely have been disclosed because other exemptions from disclosure re-
quirements would have been more difficult or impossible to apply.86 With
each new case or administrative decision finding the existence of a govern-
ment trade secret, or argument by a governmental entity that it owns trade
secrets, this problematic phenomenon will become that much more difficult
to dislodge, meaning ever more otherwise-public information will be with-
held.
Regardless of the theoretical rationale, the concept of a "government
trade secret" is an anomaly because its existence is not an incentive to en-
courage innovation (under the utilitarian theory) and has not been used as a
weapon to prevent illegal misappropriation (as in a tort-based theory of
trade secrecy). Instead, the government trade secret has a developing track
record as a last-ditch basis to deny disclosure of information to the public.
No proffered theory of trade secrecy, and especially no utilitarian construct,
can justify or even explain such an application. The very existence of a gov-
ernment trade secret can only add to the theoretical confusion marring trade
secrecy generally. Eliminating government trade secrets should help lend
clarity to why we have trade secrets generally, to whom they apply, and
what they are designed to promote and encourage. The following Part gives
examples to support this assertion.
II. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES AND WHAT THEY TEACH US
Having examined the structure and purposes of trade secrecy, its theo-
retical underpinnings, and how it operates under federal and state freedom
of information laws, we can now examine examples where state courts and
governments have allowed a government trade secret to exist. Each example
illustrates the theoretical and practical disconnect between governments and
trade secrecy, but also suggests how courts and legislatures can rectify the
problem, the focus of Part IV. Moreover, the examples suggest the real pos-
sibility of increased use of trade secrecy by governments. The examples can
be divided into three types of scenarios: (1) a governmental entity directly
competing with the private sector (examples A and perhaps B, below),
86. It is for that primary reason that I see the government trade secret exemption as a
last-ditch effort to prevent disclosure of information. Given its limited track record and odd
permutations, I envision that government counsel would use this argument as an add-on to
stronger arguments or only because no other exemption reasonably fits the scenario.
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(2) the government not competing at all with the private sector (examples C
and D(l)), and (3) the government contracting or partnering with the private
sector (examples D(1) and (2)).
These examples also illustrate the underlying reasons why governments
might want to assert trade secrecy. Aside from the obvious practical reason
that it allows for an exemption from state freedom of information laws, oth-
er rationales also come into play: the influence of private interests with
strong incentives to keep information private, the pressure to provide gov-
ernment services at the lowest cost possible, and the old-fashioned desire to
avoid public scrutiny.
A. Direct Competition: Board of Directors Papers: The Pennsylvania
Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA)
In Parsons v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency," three
reporters brought a petition for review of a decision in which the Pennsyl-
vania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), a governmental
agency that administers student loans, refused to disclose certain documents
by classifying them, in part, as trade secrets under Pennsylvania's Trade
Secrets Act (PTSA)." The reporters requested an assortment of infor-
mation, including items related to several PHEAA retreats and other
events attended by board members. Among the items requested were
vouchers (including receipts) for travel by PHEAA employees and board
members, "credit card bills for incidental expenses," expenses incurred on
a board retreat and seven other retreats, including receipts for lodging,
dining, and housing, "conference agenda, and any minutes, orders, deci-
sions or other records of any official business" conducted by the board at
a business development conference. The matter went before a court-
appointed hearing examiner, who found that even though all "expenses are
paid from money that [PHEAA] earns, not from appropriations," PHEAA
was still subject to the "Right-To-Know Law."89
Reaching the court on appeal as a case of first impression, the question
was whether the PHEAA could claim exemption from the Right-to-Know
87. Parsons v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 910 A.2d 177, 182 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2006), app. denied, 591 Pa. 686 (2007).
88. Pa. Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301-08 (West 2004).
89. See RIGHT-To-KNow ACT, ch. 3, 65 P.S. §§ 66.1-66.9 (1957), repealed by 2008,
Feb. 14, PL. 6, No. 3, § 3102(2)(ii), effective Jan. 1, 2009 (defining "public record" subject
to disclosure as "[a]ny account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement
of funds by an agency or its acquisition, use or disposal of services or of supplies, materials,
equipment or other property and any minute, order or decision by an agency fixing the per-
sonal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligation of any person or group
of persons. . . ."); Parsons, 910 A.2d at 182 ("All of PHEAA's expenses are paid from money
that it earns, not from appropriations. PHEAA uses its retreats, attended by Board members,
employees, clients and customers, to promote its business, and it pays all of the expenses for
food, lodging and so forth. No official action is taken at retreats and no minutes are kept.").
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Law's requirement of public disclosure of governmental information. Illus-
trating the complications inherent when a government agency acts in the
commercial sector, PHEAA described itself as
being different from other agencies in that it competes in the private
sector and receives no funding for its operations from the General
Assembly. It is frequently audited, including by federal regulators
and by private-sector lenders for whom it manages billions of dol-
lars in assets. It competes with hundreds of private sector lenders,
and in the 2005-2006 academic year it provided $170 million dol-
lars from earnings to fund programs for students. To foster
necessary trust, PHEAA requires potential clients and business
partners to sign confidentiality agreements, and PHEAA maintains
high security standards.90
Significantly, PHEAA noted that its Board is "controlled" by 16 legisla-
tors "acting as agents of the [Pennsylvania] General Assembly."9 PHEAA
also explained that Board members, when they engage in PHEAA activities,
"represent their party's caucus, and when they act officially on behalf of
PHEAA, they act in their legislative capacities" as "an arm of the General
Assembly."9 2
With regard to trade secrets found in the requested documents, PHEAA
explained that
disclosure of trade secrets to a competitor such as Sallie Mae would
likely cause PHEAA to lose competitive advantage and would
permit a competitor to see where PHEAA is concentrating market-
ing efforts. [PHEAA] stated that trade secrets pervade the requested
documents, revealing business initiatives, customers called upon,
purposes of marketing calls, sales and marketing methods, geo-
graphic marketing efforts and product development.93
The Court explained that "the fact that PHEAA is engaged also in prof-
itable business activities does not change the fact that it is a public
corporation and a government instrumentality and that its earnings are pub-
lic moneys about which the public has a right to know."94 It also found that
PHEAA was not exempt from nor had it met its responsibilities under the
Right-to-Know Law, which "favors public access regarding any expenditure
of public funds."95 Nonetheless, the Court's holding undermined these laws
90. Parsons, 910 A.2d at 184; see also Board Members, PHEAA, http://www.pheaa.org/
about/board-members/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (listing members of the Board,
all of whom are elected officials).
91. Parsons, 910 A.2d at 186.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 184.
94. Id. at 186.
95. Id.
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and principles and allowed PHEAA to withhold its alleged trade secrets:
"The Court is not unmindful of the fact that some of the requested records
may refer to secret information of competitive value. If so, the information
may be redacted and the balance supplied under Section 3.2 of the Right-to-
Know Law."96
Thus, in the end, even though PHEAA had used the trade secret desig-
nation to attempt to keep secret vast amounts of information that would not
fall under the statutory (i.e., commercial) definition of a trade secret (pre-
sumably vouchers and receipts) in an undoubtedly last-ditch effort to
prevent the disclosure and public scrutiny of the information," the Court
allowed PHEAA to redact information that would fall under the statutory
definition of a trade secret (i.e., new lines of business, new technology, and
methods and strategies of business development, as opposed to expense re-
ports) from documents to be disclosed to the reporters. Hence, there was
real meaning in the Court's understatement that PHEAA "may not conduct
its affairs precisely as a private entity does."9 8 Indeed, not "precisely," but
because the Court was content to ignore the crucial differences between
PHEAA and a private entity when deciding whether PHEAA was required
to release material that met the definition of a trade secret, they were treated
as a de facto private entity. This, increasingly, is how governmental entities
are treated; trade secrecy underscores the risks associated with such defacto
treatment.
Here we see a clear example of the impact of applying trade secrecy di-
vorced from its core utilitarian purpose: in the government trade secret
context, it becomes little more than a weapon to prevent disclosure rather
than an incentive to innovate.99 Had the court considered a utilitarian analy-
sis, it may have concluded that PHEAA would remain in existence at its
most fundamental level and continue to market and offer its services to the
public regardless of trade secrecy protection. PHEAA would have to work
around the alleged competitive disadvantage resulting from disclosure of its
trade secrets, as its board is made up of elected officials that answer to the
public" and Pennsylvania state law directs its activities."' Nor did the
96. Id. Section 3.2 states, in part: "If an agency determines that a public record con-
tains information which is subject to access as well as information which is not subject to
access, the agency's response shall grant access to the information which is subject to access
and deny access to the information which is not subject to access." RIGHT-TO-KNow ACT
§ 66.3-2 (1957).
97. It seems that the trade secret defense to disclosure was the worst and last of the
defendant's arguments, but the only one that it thought might keep the information from
being made public. None of the other typical exemptions from disclosure, save perhaps an
exemption for commercially valuable information, would seem to apply.
98. See Parsons, 910 A.2d at 186.
99. The theoretical underpinnings of trade secrecy were apparently irrelevant to the
court, as it all but ignored them.
100. See Parsons, 910 A.2d at 186.
101. See Student Financial Aid, 22 PA. CODE § 121.1-406 (2000).
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court require anything more than an assertion that the information had
commercial value. Instead, by ignoring trade secrecy's theoretical mooring
while at the same time apparently crediting the implicit position of PHEAA
that it is essentially just another commercial marketplace actor rather than
an instrumentality of government, the court prevented disclosure of other-
wise public records.
Aside from the theoretical problem, by replacing the designation "busi-
ness" with "government agency," significant transparency issues become
clear. Is it a problem that the "marketing efforts" of a government agency
whose board is composed of elected officials may be designated a trade
secret? Do we want or need to know to whom or what such an agency is
marketing? Do we want or need to know to whom or what these legislators,
as board members of PHEAA and elected officials, are, by extension, mar-
keting? Do we want or need to know what "products" are in development in
a government agency? Or exactly how such public revenues are earned?
Aside from the potentially corrupting influence of private financing in our
elections process generally, one could imagine actual criminal acts, like
bribery or other forms of public corruption, entering into the equation for a
dishonest public official. Or is it more important that PHEAA be able to
conduct its business in the most competitively advantageous manner? Such
are the issues and questions raised when trade secrets exist in government.
There is a clear trade-off between transparency and accountability versus
alleged governmental efficiencies and commercial benefits, and as I discuss
more thoroughly below, I am inclined to believe that we need to know the
answers to the above questions, even if it means the government agency
loses some competitive advantage.
The tougher question becomes when (or if) the competitive advantage
outweighs the public's desire or need to know. Like private sector actors,
governments entering the commercial market can benefit from trade secrets.
The disclosure of government trade secrets might have consequences that
mimic those in the private sector. For example, as one Australian commenta-
tor has noted, government benchmarks and financial calculations can fall
under the rubric of trade secrecy. If such calculations were disclosed to
those seeking government contracts, as in the United States Air Force
("USAF") example below (example D(2)), bidders in the private sector
could reconstruct the benchmark for subsequent projects and price bids
accordingly, thus disadvantaging the government and its ability to price con-
tracts in the most cost-effective manner.102
Of course, that consideration raises the question of how far one can go
with that argument. As Moira Paterson notes, "if such logic were taken to its
conclusion, the cost of any government activity could be considered a trade
102. See Paterson, supra note 18, at 327. But see infra Part 1I.D(2) (USAF example).
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secret, if there were a possibility that at some time that service could be put
out to tender." 03 Arie Freiberg explains:
[P]ublic costs are often unknown or uncalculated, while private
costs tend to be regarded as commercially confidential. For a proper
evaluation and comparison of costs to take place, both the public
and private sectors will need to make their bottom lines, if not their
calculations, more transparent. In the absence of valid comparisons,
the process of contractualisation will continue to be based on ideol-
ogy rather than economics.'O
Thus, the operation of government trade secrecy in a climate in which se-
crecy is considered an acceptable norm for government contracting allows
the government to remain on more equal footing in relation to their private
partners and contractors, but can lead to a slippery slope where wide swaths
of information can be painted with the trade secrecy brush.
That slippery slope is ultimately a major concern. Consider a hypothet-
ical: the New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation ("OTB"), until
recently, operated a vast wagering system that allowed an individual to bet
on horse races without actually being at the race track. OTB was a "public-
benefit corporation," a governmental entity whose profits go to the public. 0 5
OTB's president was appointed by the Mayor of the City of New York.'I Its
mission was to "raise needed revenue for the City [of New York] and State
[of New York], to combat organized crime's hold on gambling on horse
races by providing a legal alternative and to be . . . compatible with the
well-being of the New York State's racing industry.""' Now place OTB or
any similar profit-making entity, like state lotteries or liquor stores, in the
vast majority of states that allow government trade secrets. What would the
public want to know about OTB? Given that part of its mission is to help
combat organized crime's hold on horse race gambling, the public might
want to know that OTB has not been influenced or captured by organized
crime. Documents relating to methods or strategies for developing new lines
of business might suggest that OTB has had contact with suspicious persons
or entities or is considering business plans or methods that warrant investi-
gation. Alternatively, they may prove that OTB is acting true to its mission
and is an entity free of illegal influence.
103. See Paterson, supra note 18, at 327.
104. Arie Freiberg, Commercial Confidentiality, Criminal Justice and the Public Inter-
est, CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST., Nov. 1997, at 125, 136.
105. See Off-Track Betting, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/h/horse-racing/offtrack-betting/index.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2010).
OTB has recently ceased operations but, as a hypothetical, the example is still useful.
106. N.Y. RACING, PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING AND BREEDING LAW § 502.1 (McKinney
2000).
107. See Off-Track Betting, supra note 105.
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However, faced with a request for such documents, OTB could have
chosen to assert a trade secret exemption to freedom of information laws. As
the court decided in the PHEAA case, a state court in any state that allows
government trade secrets might find that the information is OTB's trade
secret and therefore exempt it from disclosure. Failing to release the infor-
mation would not serve the public interest if corruption exists within OTB,
or it may conversely engender public suspicion where none is warranted.'0
Nonetheless, using reasoning similar to the court's in the PHEAA case,
OTB would have been allowed to make a self-interested assessment of
whether it wants to release the information or not based upon trade secrecy
law, without regard to the public's potential need for or right to the infor-
mation. This is not the purpose of trade secrecy, and it definitely does not
sound like transparent and accountable government.
In sum, the private sector relies upon clearly defined and enforceable
property rights for proper functioning and to spur innovation. Trade secrecy
can arguably help serve that purpose.109 The government seems to be jump-
ing on the property rights bandwagon. The government does not, however,
generally need to be incentivized to innovate by way of pecuniary gain, alt-
hough one could envision a cash-strapped agency seeking to increase its
budget by way of intellectual property development and licensing. A demo-
cratic government's mandate comes from the people only, and maintenance
and development of new programs and services are required by the law,
rules, and requirements imposed upon it by the public. It is doubtful that
PHEAA and other governmental entities would come up with fewer ideas or
services if the trade secrets exemption were unavailable.
B. Government as Provider of Commercial Goods: Firearm Registry:
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Canada is facing similar issues grappling with the increasingly com-
mercial aspects of governmental operations. For example, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") refused to disclose a CD-ROM ver-
sion of "open source" data regarding a firearm registry that included
photographs, documentation, and specifications for various firearms to a
member of the public." 10 The CD-ROM was used by the RCMP to "assist it
in identifying the firearms that its members encounter in police work.""'
108. The latter scenario, where guesswork replaces real and verifiable information, is
what late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan eloquently labeled "ignorant armies clash[ing]
by night." Secrecy, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing at length the benefits to society of less
governmental secrecy).
109. Of course, it would be helpful if trade secrecy stood on a widely accepted theoret-
ical footing.
110. See OFFICE OF THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000:
SELLING GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE 60-61 (2000), available at http://www.infocom.gc.cal
eng/rp-pr-ar-ra-archive.aspx.
Ill. Id. at 60.
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Compiled by RCMP at a cost of three million dollars, police organizations
around the world have shown interest in the data.'l 2
To compile the list, RCMP disclosed the CD-ROM free of charge to a
group of public volunteers called "verifiers." The verifiers helped gun own-
ers complete registration paperwork in return for free training and a copy of
the CD-ROM."' The complainant, a Canadian citizen who chose not be
become a verifier, requested a copy of the CD-ROM from RCMP. RCMP
denied access, stating that:
[1] [T]he CD-ROM contained financial, commercial, scientific or
technical information that belongs to the Government of Canada or
a government institution and that has substantial value or is reason-
ably likely to have substantial value; and [2] disclosure of the
information in the record could reasonably be expected to prejudice
the competitive position of a government institution.' "
Subsequently, the complainant appealed the decision to the Canadian
Information Commissioner ("CIC"), which found that the withholding of
the CD-ROM was justified under Section 18 of the Canadian Access to In-
formation Act (Act). Section 18 of the Act allows a government institution to
refuse access to information where "trade secrets ... that belong to the Gov-
emnment of Canada or a government institution and [have] substantial value or
[are] reasonably likely to have substantial value" are involved. In addition, the
Act exempts from disclosure information that "could reasonably be expected
to be materially injurious to the financial interest of the Government of Cana-
da.""' The CIC explained in summary that "unrestricted disclosure of this
record could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of
the RCMP," and that the database had commercial value to the government
"since there was continuing interest in the CD-ROM by national and inter-
national organizations" and interest in partnership agreements to produce
future registries. Thus, the RCMP was engaged in the creation of a "com-
mercial product.""'6
While the RCMP case fell under Canadian law, it is nonetheless illus-
trative. Here, the potential commercial interests of Canada in selling the
CD-ROM and producing future versions prevented the dissemination of a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. This explanation, which borrows its language from the Canadian Access to
Information Act, see infra note 115, seems to largely mirror the UTSA definition of a trade
secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT 14 U.L.A. 1(4) (1985).
115. See ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. The Act exempts "infor-
mation the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive
position of a government institution." Id. It also exempts "scientific or technical information
obtained through research by an officer or employee of a government institution, the disclo-
sure of which could reasonably be expected to deprive the officer or employee of priority of
publication ..... " Id.
116. OFFICE OF THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., supra note 110, at 61.
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database created with public funds and input. Putting aside the question of
whether such a database should be made public for security and law en-
forcement reasons, trade secrecy directly impeded the dissemination of an
otherwise public and taxpayer-funded database. More specifically, the
speculative ability of the government of Canada to eventually sell the
CD-ROM for profit prevented the information, created with taxpayer
funds, from being freely distributed to its own citizens. As with the
PHEAA example, the commercial interest asserted by a government, rather
than openness, was the main consideration.
The RMCP case illustrates a basic objection to government trade se-
crets. As a general matter, economist Joseph Stiglitz asserts that "a
governmental entity should generally not be allowed to withhold infor-
mation from the public solely because it believes such withholding increases
its net revenue."' But the CIC, recognizing a possible trend of increased
assertion of commercial interests by governments, prognosticated under the
heading "Lessons Learned" that "[als government organizations increasing-
ly embark on commercial ventures to generate revenues, refusals of access
based on commercial value or threat to competitive position will undoubted-
ly increase."" 8 This is the fundamental trend that must be addressed. Stiglitz
succinctly states the objection to government trade secrets from which other
critiques flow: focusing primarily on the effects of disclosure on a govern-
ment's net revenues is a poor way to make policy about government
disclosure. The danger is that if trade secrecy law is applied automatically to
government information, effects on net revenues will too often be the sole or
deciding factor in making disclosure decisions.
C. Government in Its Traditional Role: Public School Examinations:
City of Cincinnati Public Schools
Another startling example of an alleged government trade secret was
recently identified by the Ohio Supreme Court, which found that public
school multiple choice and essay questions are trade secrets of the City of
Cincinnati Public Schools ("CPS"). In Perrea v. Cincinnati Public Schools,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that public school semester examinations,
after being administered to ninth-grade students, constituted trade secrets
and were therefore exempt from disclosure under Ohio's open government
laws.119 Here, the court implicitly used a utilitarian theory of trade secrecy
117. JOSEPH STIGLITZ ET AL., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN A DIGITAL AGE 70
(2000), available at http://archive.epinet.org/real-media/0101 1 1/materials/stiglitz.pdf.
118. OFFICE OF THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., supra note 110, at 61.
119. State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Sch., 916 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2009); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 2011) (listing exceptions to disclosure listing); Ohio Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61-69 (West 2011). It is important to note
that CPS paid a private entity to develop the examinations, but CPS alleged that the examina-
tions were its own trade secrets as opposed to those of the private entity, and the private
entity did not appear in the case.
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and accepted the city's assertions that the tests constituted exempt trade se-
crets, but ignored the obvious impact on public transparency as well as the
private commercial context of trade secret law.
Perrea, a teacher in CPS, requested the examinations from CPS because
he was "concerned about the design, implementation, and scoring of the
semester exams."120 The court explained that he
wanted copies of the ninth-grade semester exams administered in
January 2007 and that he "did not intend to use the copies for any
commercial purpose." Perrea specified that he would use the copies
only "for criticism, research, comment, and/or education." Consistent
with a petition signed by about 60 CPS teachers, Perrea noted in one
of his requests that he wanted the exams to be released so that they
could be evaluated by an independent, qualified psychometrician
for "fairness, accuracy, and validity."'21
After CPS refused to produce the exams, Perrea brought an action to
compel their production. In arguing that the examinations were exempt from
disclosure as trade secrets, CPS pointed out that it spent over $750,000 to
develop ninth, tenth, and eleventh-grade examinations, took steps to main-
tain the secrecy of the exams, and reuses the same questions each year.122
The court rejected Perrea's argument that the placement of essay question
scoring guidelines on CPS's intranet constituted public dissemination of the
exams (and hence rendered them something other than trade secrets), ex-
plaining that the scoring guidelines do not "restate the actual test questions"
and were not accessible without the intranet address, which the court found
was not known to non-teachers.123 Furthermore, the court accepted CPS's
assertion that since it would be unable to use the exams if they were made
public (as their effectiveness would be compromised), the expense of recre-
ating the exams would make administering the exams cost prohibitive and
render the revealed questions unusable in the future.124 Thus, relying on
Besser,125 which established the principle that governments may have trade
secrets in Ohio, the court found that the examinations were not public rec-
ords, but rather trade secrets exempt from disclosure.
120. Perrea, 916 N.E.2d at 1051.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1053.
123. Id. at 1054. A concurring opinion by two justices found that only the multiple
choice questions were trade secrets since "CPS has not established that it made reasonable
efforts to secure its internet website." Id. at 1055. Also, in oral argument, the court apparent-
ly rejected Perrea's argument that distribution of the tests to students destroyed their trade
secret status since a test must be distributed to students. The court stated that "the question is
what you do afterward." Transcript of Oral Argument, id. It would seem, however, that Per-
rea's arguments have merit since trade secrecy is generally destroyed by public
dissemination. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (1939).
124. Perrea, 916 N.E.2d at 1053.
125. See State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 721 N.E.2d 1044 (Ohio 2000).
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Certainly, one may be sympathetic to a city board of education's desire
to avoid the cost of having to create new exams each year. But here, trade
secrecy again has no place and is the wrong vehicle by which to make such
an argument. While Ohio state law limited the court's options in deciding
this case, the court nonetheless failed to consider the private commercial
context of trade secret law or address Perrea's public interest reasons for
wanting the examinations.
There were at least two opportunities where the court might have identi-
fied the oddity of finding a CPS trade secret. First, Ohio law, modeled after
the UTSA, follows the general definition that a trade secret must, in part,
"derive[] independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use."1 26
The court completely ignored this requirement; in fact, other than quoting
the statutes, it never used the words "compete," "competitor," or even the
phrase "economic value" in its opinion. This is not surprising, since it is
hard to conceive who or what would be the competitor of a public school
system in the administration of its own examinations or gain economic val-
ue from access to the examinations in a way cognizable by the law.127 Even
if the court had envisioned CPS students or teachers as "other persons"
gaining some sort of "economic value" from having access to the examina-
tions that didn't involve cheating or malfeasance, trade secret law, as a beast
of commercial private competition, is not designed to address such an ar-
gument.128 Therefore, the court missed the point because the law does not fit
the public body context in which it has been situated.
Moreover, Ohio law, following common law principles, requires courts
to consider the following factors, which all sound in competition, to deter-
mine whether a trade secret exists:
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known inside the business, i.e., by
the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade
secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings ef-
fected and the value to the holder in having the information as
against competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in
obtaining and developing the information; and (6) the amount of
126. Perrea, 916 N.E.2d at 1053 (quoting Ohio Unif. Trade Secrets Act, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1333.61(D) (West 2011) (emphasis added)).
127. Conceivably, private tutor services could use such questions as part of a test prepa-
ration service, but those would not be competitors of the public school in the administration
of the tests themselves. Moreover, schools gives tests as part of their core administrative
duties, and test preparation entities serve to augment the preparation of the students taking
the tests, not to compete with schools.
128. See State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 747 N.E.2d 255, 259
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
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time and expense it would take for others to acquire and duplicate
the information.129
Assuming that the court even attempted to identify a competitor of CPS in
the administration of exams, once the court could not identify such an entity
it should have paused and taken the opportunity to reconsider its position.
Indeed, the fact that Perrea himself was not a competitor of CPS, but rather
one of its employees, should have been considered. Instead, the court did
not address the issue at all, so we now have a precedent establishing that
public school examinations are trade secrets, meaning that they have eco-
nomic value to a public school system's unidentified and questionable
competitors and others who might theoretically obtain value from them.
As such, Perrea further establishes that trade secrecy law does not fit
well when the entity claiming the trade secret is a public body, especially
one that has no competitors and relies on taxpayer funding to survive. The
lack of a clear competitor to a governmental entity should be an automatic
disqualifier for trade secret protection especially given the severe impact
on transparency and accountability created by finding a government
trade secret.
Notably absent in the Ohio UTSA and the above list of factors is any
consideration of whether the public at large has a legal right or need to
know the subject information. That absence should not come as a surprise
since trade secrecy law has always been conceived as involving competition
between private parties. As a general matter, a private party does not have a
legal right to know another's trade secret unless a licensing agreement or
some other confidential arrangement has been created; thus, whether the
public has an interest in the information is irrelevant from a trade secrecy
perspective.
Where does this leave the public? The public has a general right to know
governmental information unless a specified exemption from disclosure
applies. But, when a court (a) applies a list of trade secret defining factors
that are designed to ascertain a private entity's commercial interest and
investment in the subject information and that naturally do not consider the
public's interest, if any, in accessing the subject information, and then
(b) uses the result in a rule that simply states that trade secrets are exempt
from public disclosure carte blanche, the decision about whether disclosure
is warranted becomes easy because the public's interest has nothing to do
with the decision. Perrea represents a primary example of the simple fact
that when we take a utilitarian doctrine designed with private entities in
mind and apply it to public entities, we can get results that we may not
want, and certainly that do not encompass the considerations of the public at
large. Perrea is a strange result when viewed as a citizen's request to
129. Perrea, 916 N.E.2d at 1053 (emphasis added). This list is problematic on its face
since it seems to downplay the commercial competition framework of trade secrecy.
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analyze public school examinations that have already been administered to
independently determine their efficacy, 3o but if viewed as merely a request
to disclose a garden-variety trade secret, it is not so strange and even
arguably correct.' 3
D. Public Contracting: County of San Diego and
the United States Air Force
The next two examples involve public contracting. These examples, es-
pecially the second involving the USAF, can be viewed as hybrid
public/private trade secrets, since they implicate information relating to a
private entity. Nonetheless, I include them here to emphasize the impact of
government contracting on the questions herein. Importantly, the San Diego
scenario, like Perrea, is an example of the government asserting the trade
secret exemption based on its own interests, rather than asserting it on be-
half of a private entity. Also, it is an example of a potential affirmative use
of trade secrecy as a misappropriation claim, rather than a shield to public
disclosure of information. Conversely, the USAF scenario involves the gov-
ernment asserting the trade secret rights of a private entity, which is a
related but fundamentally different scenario than those discussed before and
does not involve a government trade secret as defined in this Article. None-
theless, I include it for purposes of completeness to show the impact of
trade secrecy generally on the public's ability to access information about
how its money is spent.
1. Government's Core Functions: Voting Machine
Modifications by the County of San Diego
In 2003 the County of San Diego, California ("San Diego"), contracted
with Diebold Election Systems, Inc. ("Diebold," now doing business as
Premier Election Solutions) for the provision of voting machines to San
Diego by Diebold. In a paragraph entitled "County Product" under the
130. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court had previously recognized the value of public
access to administered state examinations. The court found, in the context of a request to
release portions of the Twelfth Grade Ohio Proficiency Test and the Ohio Vocational Compe-
tency Assessment, "As education of its citizenry is one of the most important functions of the
state, the legislature has made it clear its intent that parents, students, and citizens have ac-
cess to these tests in order to foster scrutiny and comment on them free from restraint." Rea
v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 81 Ohio St. 3d 527, 531 (Ohio 1998).
131. 1 am mindful of the fact that, as a law professor, should I ever work at a public
university, the position advanced herein could require me to disclose my exams-if trade
secrecy were the only basis for non-disclosure. However, because I might retain copyright in
my works of authorship, there would be other ways that I possibly could prevent such disclo-
sure. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (allowing owners to control
reproduction, distribution, and display of original works). I raise this point to emphasize that
I am addressing only the inappropriateness of the trade secrecy exemption in the government
trade secret context. I take no position on the applicability or efficacy of other freedom of
information law exemptions or how they conflict with the general principle of openness.
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heading "Proprietary Considerations," the parties agreed, in relevant part,
that "all plans, reports, acceptance test criteria, acceptance test plans, the
[Statement of Work], departmental procedures and processes, data, and in-
formation and other similar materials developed by County [of San Diego]
... (collectively "County Product"), and all . . . trade secret rights ... there-
in shall be the sole property of [the] County [of San Diego]."'32 Thus, San
Diego contracted for the trade secret rights in its modifications to voting
machines that it purchased from Diebold.133
Why San Diego placed this language in the contract is unclear, especial-
ly since it has no competitors in the facilitation of its elections and has a
strong legal mandate, independent of trade secret protection, in running
proper elections. But one could easily envision that San Diego will ignore
that issue and might attempt to take the same position as Diebold in the face
of a freedom of information request, namely, that information relating to
those modifications is exempt from disclosure under trade secrecy, pure and
simple.'34 Why allow the public to second-guess and challenge elections if
trade secrecy law can be asserted to prevent such problems?
As with Perrea, San Diego suffers the same two errors of ignoring the
purpose of trade secrecy law and the public's interest. First, since California
also follows the UTSA,135 it is hard to identify who or what might compete
with or gain economic advantage over San Diego in the modification of its
voting machines and the facilitation of its elections or how the public could
be viewed to have misappropriated information about how its own voting
machines operate. Moreover, San Diego needs no incentive to administer
elections or use accurate voting machines, as that is one of the core roles of
any democratic government. Secondly, how (or whether) a voting machine
132. County of San Diego Registrar of Voters Direct Record Electronic Voting System
Contract No. 46619, 17. (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://accurate-voting.org/
contracts/CA/San-Diego/CA-sandiego_2003.pdf.
133. On behalf of the County, the contract is signed by its Director, Department of
Purchasing and Contracting, and a Senior Deputy County Counsel. Id.
134. Whether it would be successful is another matter. While it is beyond the scope of
the Article to thoroughly examine California law, California Civil Code § 3426 ("California
UTSA") adopts the UTSA and grants trade secret holders protection from misappropriation.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426 (2011). The California UTSA defines a "person" who can have a trade
secret as "a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability
company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any
other legal or commercial entity." Id. While this issue has not been litigated in California, it
would seem possible on this basis that a California court might find a government trade se-
cret exempt from disclosure. On the other hand, the California Open Records Act, CAL. Gov.
CODE § 6250 ("California Act"), does not expressly reference trade secrets as information
exempt from public disclosure. CAL. Gov. CODE § 6250 (2011). However, under § 6254(k),
the California Act does exempt "[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited
pursuant to federal or state law," which leaves open the question of whether the court would
therefore find that because FOIA does not allow for governments to assert the trade secrecy
exemption, San Diego could not either. Id.
135. Id.
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works is perhaps the prototypical example of information that the public
should have a right to know regardless of the owner's trade secret claims.13 6
San Diego is perhaps the most extreme example of the problems with
government trade secrets. Here, the county, funded by taxpayers and whose
mission is to facilitate free and accurate elections, has claimed trade secrecy
protection in its own modification of voting machines, the primary instru-
ment of democratic elections. In doing so, it has suggested that it has a
competitor in the operation of county elections, and has potentially given
itself the option to prevent the public from inspecting-or, from its apparent
perspective, misappropriating-the government's modifications of the pub-
lic's own voting machines.137 Under any theory of trade secrecy, this
scenario is a perversion of trade secrecy law itself, as the existence of a
trade secret right in voting machine modifications does not fit within the
purposes of trade secrecy law and creates the ability for governments to
prevent disclosure of the operation of voting machines to the public at large.
It equally turns transparency and accountability on their heads, as it is im-
possible to have either when the public may not be able to inspect the very
machines that are used to ostensibly guarantee the most fundamental of
democratic government principles: a free, open, and accurate election. Even
in our age of excessive lobbying and closed-door lawmaking, this is a
shocking display of disregard for the public's interest in accountable gov-
emnment.
2. Government as Contractor: Prices Paid
by the United States Air Force
Lastly, we can examine a related but fundamentally different situation
where dollar amounts spent by a public entity are designed as a trade secret
by a private entity. In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Widnall,13 8 the
United States Air Force received a FOIA request from General Dynamics
Corp. regarding pricing and unexercised options under a contract between
the USAF and McDonnell Douglas Corporation ("McDonnell"), a competi-
tor. The USAF contacted McDonnell, which advised the USAF that certain
"line item prices" contained in the contract were, among other designations,
trade secrets. The USAF decided that a separate federal regulation required
it to release the information. As a result, McDonnell wound up suing the
136. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 180-83 for an extended discussion of this issue.
137. Perhaps San Diego plans to sell or license its modifications back to the vendor or
another municipal entity, but that is not apparent from the document, and contract law can
achieve this result without resort to trade secrecy.
138. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also
David Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND
THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 430-32 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Katherine J. Strandburg eds.,
2011) (from which this subpart is, in part, excerpted).
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USAF in a "reverse" FOIA action to enjoin disclosure of, among other in-
formation, the line item prices. 39
For a variety of unusual administrative and procedural reasons not rele-
vant to the present discussion, the USAF never explicitly took a position as
to whether the line item prices were trade secrets. As a result, and because
of the administrative posture of the case, the court found that it was not re-
quired to issue a holding on the issue. While the court noted that the USAF
"implicitly" contested the designation of the line item prices as trade secrets,
it stated in dicta that "[a]lthough the idea that a price charged to the
government for specific goods or services could be a 'trade secret' appears
passing strange to us, we agree with the government that it is not open to us
to attempt to decide that issue at this stage."'40 The case was remanded to
the district court and ultimately back to the USAF so that the USAF could
provide a "considered and complete statement" of its position; however, the
court never resolved the trade secret question.
It is indeed "passing strange" that such information could be desig-
nated as a trade secret; after all, this involved expended taxpayer
dollars.141 Yet at the administrative level at which the FOIA request was
evaluated, the designation of the line item prices as trade secrets by
McDonnell determined the disposition of the FOIA request. As a result, the
disclosure of basic information regarding the prices paid by the USAF for
goods and services was delayed and might have been forever halted. While
the court, in a different procedural and administrative posture, might have
ruled that the information was not a trade secret, McDonnell's position
appears to have been at least colorable-the designation was de facto ac-
cepted by the USAF, necessitating litigation to challenge the trade secrecy
assertion.
Widnall highlights another fundamental problem in FOIA: the broad
modem definition of a trade secret controls in light of the lack of a trade
secret definition within the FOIA statute itself. If a court applies the broad
modem definition of a private commercial trade secret,14 2 it is quite conceiva-
ble that, based on the descriptions afforded by the putative owner of the trade
secret, be it government or the private sector, it could find a wide swath of
requested information with significant public importance to constitute trade
139. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 57 F.3d at 1165.
140. Id. at 1167.
141. See Gregory H. McClure, The Treatment of Contract Prices under the Trade Se-
crets Act and Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4: Are Contract Prices Really Trade
Secrets?, 31 PuB. CONT. L.J. 185 (2002) (taking the position that contract prices are not trade
secrets).
142. Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1-4 and Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985) with Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v.
Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C. 1983) (articulating a narrower definition
of a trade secret tailored to FOIA requests that is followed by many courts and has been
accepted as the definition of a trade secret for purposes of FOIA).
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secrets. Applying the letter of the law, such a court might end up denying tax-
payers the ability to discover what the USAF (and hence taxpayers
themselves) are paying for goods and services. Such a result does not seem
to serve the purpose of FOIA; it is certainly not transparency.
The ambiguous and increasingly intrusive trade secret exemption in
FOIA and state freedom of information laws is a serious challenge to our
conception of a transparent and accountable government. As the govern-
ment increasingly regulates and partners with private industry, we can
expect that the trade secrets exemption will be of mounting importance.143
As it stands today, we often sacrifice transparency on the altar of protecting
the commercial interests of trade secret owners, which courts have found to
include governments themselves. While it would be inappropriate to ad-
vance a position that calls for the complete absence of any trade secret
exemption under FOIA, in light of the danger of disclosing a legitimate
trade secret to the trade secret holder's competitors, we currently have a
freedom of information scheme, on both the federal and state levels, that
gives short shrift to concerns about transparent and accountable government
in the trade secrecy context. As public-private partnerships and government
commercial activities increase, more frequent assertion of government trade
secrets may leave us by default with policies and practices that would not
stand up to public scrutiny if the policies were made by legislatures in an
open, deliberative fashion.
III. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH TRADE SECRECY: IF THE PEOPLE HAVE TRADE SECRETS,
THEN THE PEOPLE MUST KNOW THE TRADE SECRETS
As the previous examples indicate, aside from my concerns about trade
secrecy doctrine and its application as discussed above, the issue of public
input and the values of transparency and accountability are fundamental to
my concern about the existence of government trade secrets. As I argued in
Secrecy, to blindly allow government trade secrets ignores the fundamental
difference between a purely commercial entity distributing private commer-
cial goods and services and an entity operating in the public infrastructure
sphere that is required to be both transparent and accountable." While we
might want natural monopolies, like public utilities, to be run by govern-
ments so as to prevent monopoly pricing by private entities, governments
still should not be in the business of keeping information secret just because
it might theoretically have some modicum of pecuniary value or keep costs
marginally lower. The mere possibility that a government could gain com-
143. A focus of future research should include a detailed study of the actual use of
FOIA's trade secret exemption by the federal government. Of course, that would require
filing many FOIA requests.
144. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 164-65.
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mercial advantage or even recoup the costs of developing a good or service
should not be the primary policy objective of a government.
However, the question is not that simple. Governments no longer play
the single role of handling the public's core business, like the City of San
Diego's administration of elections, the CPS's administration of school
examinations, or the United States Air Force's defense of the nation. As
the PHEAA case illustrates, governments now openly act in the private
sector, form public corporations, and compete with private entities or
partner with them. Governments are in the "business" of providing goods
and services to the public, and part of that charge has increasingly been to
outsource or contract out traditional governmental functions to private
entities or even compete directly with the private sector.145 As the Canadi-
an Information Commissioner predicted (example B), to the extent that
the government seeks to maximize its ability to provide goods and ser-
vices to the public on its own, trade secrecy will likely play an increasing
role. Therefore, as trade secrecy increases its prominence in government
operations, we can reasonably expect that the assertion of trade secrecy
rights by governments will increase, primarily as a shield to prevent dis-
closure of information but perhaps also as a sword to assert trade
secret misappropriation.
Unless a strong and pervasive conception of government that prioritizes
transparency and accountability develops, the increasing involvement of
government in the commercial sphere could create a situation where apply-
ing trade secret protection in the government context does not appear to be
theoretically problematic. Especially as trade secrecy's theoretical
underpinnings remain in flux or are believed to not exist,146 trade secrecy
could be found to be in harmony with amorphous public or governmental
values. Trade secrecy's very lack of a strongly unified theoretical underpin-
ning that is uniformly accepted allows it to continuously morph to fit a
given scenario, making it a legal shape-shifter that eludes a clear line of
analysis in its application to government.
Indeed, that is what we see with the PHEAA and CPS examples. In
PHEAA, while the court challenged the designation of particular infor-
mation as trade secrets, the government still found a legally justifiable
way to use it. In CPS, the court ultimately chose to read the law in an in-
complete but unchallenged way and came to a logical result. 4 7 Akin to
Professor Epstein's argument,' 4 1 the governmental entities met the test for
trade secret application, and that was the end of the analysis from a pre-
clusion standpoint. The basic threshold of applicability was met. So why
145. IRS FreeFile, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=
11 8986,00.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2011).
146. Bone, supra note 37.
147. See supra Part IIA, II.C.
148. Epstein, supra note 30, at 1044-45.
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have courts and legislatures allowed the government to have trade secrets?
The answer seems to be that courts simply consider whether the infor-
mation meets the elements of the applicable trade secrecy tests, divorcing
those tests from (a) any clear and robust theoretical underpinning in trade
secrecy or democracy, (b) any notion of the public's interest in the hidden
information, or (c) the context of promoting fair private competition and
punishing misappropriation.
If we view government as primarily a commercial actor, as in the
PHEAA example, the practical problems seem less severe (although still
quite problematic) because the government is in the role of a business seek-
ing to compete and earn revenues, and trade secrecy is a legitimate means
towards that goal. But the government does not yet act in a commercial
manner generally and we do not uniformly view government through such
an altered lens. Therefore, it is a good time to consider this conflict as the
issue begins to arise with more frequency, especially in areas where the
government has no competition.149
Before automatic trade secrecy becomes a conscious, standard operat-
ing procedure for governments, a fundamental question must be answered:
whether trade secrecy is part of the bundle of rights upon which govern-
ments can and should rely in order to serve the public. Where arguably
applicable, as in situations where the government competes directly with the
private sector, the price of that secrecy and the perverse incentives that it
may engender should be weighed against the economic benefits of the use
of the right. In most other situations, however, trade secrecy will fall on its
own inapplicability to the governmental activity at issue.
A. Trade Secrecy, Transparency, Accountability,
and Deliberative Democracy Theory
In order to give a theoretical and practical underpinning as to why gov-
ernment trade secrets might be viewed as problematic from the perspective
of democratic governance, it is important to have operative definitions of the
words "accountability" and "transparency" and to understand the basics of
the relationship between the two concepts.'5 0 Professor Glen Staszewski has
defined accountability in the context of deliberative governmental opera-
tions as a "requirement or expectation that [public officials] give reasoned
explanations for their decisions."' 5' In order to have the possibility of ac-
149. Note that the use of trade secrecy in the private sector is on the rise. See Secrecy,
supr'a note 1, at 139. This trend could be mirrored in the public sector.
150. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 158-62 (discussing at length the history of these
ideas and their centrality to democratic government).
151. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253,
1279 (2009). Accountability has been similarly defined as "the ability of one actor to demand
an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that
second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation." Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
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countability, transparency is required.152 Transparency may be defined as
"the ability of the citizenry to observe and scrutinize policy choices and to
have a direct say in the formation and reformulation of these decisions." 53
With that basic framework, we can outline deliberative democracy theo-
ry. It is important to note at the outset that I invoke deliberative democracy
purposefully as it is has recently been described as "the model [that] focuses
on the very features of an ideal political structure that seem lacking in our
current system for corporate lawmaking." 54 Given its application to creating
corporate law and in other fields, it is logical to apply it to public officials
generally in the context of commercial trade secret law.
Deliberative democracy theory advocates posit that "public officials are
not held politically accountable for their specific policy decisions pursuant
to periodic elections, and there are overwhelming reasons to believe that this
will never be the case."' Thus, deliberative democracy theory stands as the
modern alternative to relying on elections to achieve accountability. Profes-
sor Staszewski frames deliberative democracy in the context of modern
governmental operations as positing that:
individual policy choices are democratically legitimate to the extent
that they are supported by public-regarding explanations that could
reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamen-
tally different interests and perspectives. Accordingly, public
officials can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or
expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions
that meet those criteria.'5 6
Deliberative democracy theory has a number of public benefits. Pri-
marily, it allows for citizens to "engage in fairly sophisticated deliberation
about public policy."' This deliberation and debate can eliminate or severe-
ly hinder a public official's ability to self-deal, make selfish policy choices,
and engage in "naked preferences" for one individual group over another.',
Moreover, it can expose common ground among citizens.'5 9 Ultimately, it
can lead to better decisions.
152. Jane Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REv. 737, 756 (2004).
153. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IowA L. REV. 1107, 1164 (2000).
154. Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redun-
dancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1281 (2009) (citing Staszewski, among other authors, for
the assertion that "[dieliberative democracy has been embraced as an analytical framework
by legal scholars working in a range of fields").
155. Staszewski, supra note 151, at 1254.
156. Id. at 1255.
I57. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IowA L. REv. 1287, 1303
(2004).
158. Id.
159. Staszewski, supra note 151, at 1279-85.
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But deliberative democracy requires transparency in order for it to be
operative; without transparency, deliberative democracy cannot exist. As
Staszewski explains:
If citizens are unaware that a particular governmental official has
made a specific policy decision, they cannot possibly hold that offi-
cial accountable in any meaningful way for this action. A
requirement or expectation that the public official will provide a
reasoned explanation for the decision enables interested citizens
and other public officials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize the ac-
tion, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform. For this
process to work, the reasons that governmental officials provide for
their decisions must ordinarily be publicly available.' 60
Thus, as illustrated in all of the examples above, when trade secrecy pre-
vents the public from accessing basic information that would allow for the
public to "evaluate, discuss, and criticize the action'" whether it be
PHEAA's marketing of products and services, the efficacy of CPS's tests,
the operation of San Diego's voting machines, or USAF's expenditure of
public funds, deliberative democracy, in addition to the openness that we
need in a democracy generally, is defeated.
There is a slippery slope potential if the concept of a government trade
secret takes hold; namely, that there are too many potential benefits to a
governmental entity that seeks to avoid public scrutiny. There are a variety
of pernicious reasons that governmental officials or agencies might want to
keep a secret, as explained by Robert E. Gellman, a former chief counsel to
the House of Representatives' Government Operations' Subcommittee on
Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture:
The reasons agencies, government officials, and legislators want to
control the information in their domain are many and varied. In-
formation may be a source of power that can be best exploited in an
environment of secrecy. Information may be closely held in order to
avoid embarrassment, to evade oversight, to establish a function
and create jobs at an agency, to develop a constituency of users, or
to develop a source of revenue. While not every agency, bureaucrat,
160. Id. at 128 1. While there are potential downsides to deliberative democracy theory,
like the possibility that posturing and polarization could occur if too much information is
revealed, it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully critique it. See ADRIAN VERMEULE,
MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 196 (2007). Rather, I apply it here because it is currently a
dominant theory with a growing currency. I posit, however, that under any theory of demo-
cratic government that involves transparency and accountability, government trade secrets
are problematic.
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or politician will find a motive to control every government infor-
mation product or service, the temptations are there.''
It is the unwarranted and unjustified control of government information
that is at the heart of my concern. In an early analysis regarding whether
and how government data may be used by the private sector given new
information technologies, Gellman noted that "[c]ontrols that may be in-
tended to prevent unfairness or misquoting might also be used to prevent
uncomplimentary use of data, censor information, or hide documents."' 62
Trade secrecy, as a doctrine resting partially (but not primarily) on the no-
tion of preventing unfair competition, can easily be misused to achieve a
similar outcome. Moreover, as Gellman notes, "these powers have always
been denied to government."' 63 Trade secrecy, at least at the state level, ap-
pears to be an exception to that statement. Trade secrecy offers an
opportunity to control the public dissemination of information with limited
theoretical or practical basis or justification, and can threaten democracy as
a result. As summarized by Professor Jerry Mashaw in the context of admin-
istrative reason giving, "administration without reason cannot meet the
challenge of defending its democratic legitimacy." 64
B. Agency Theory
A second related theory with which government trade secrecy conflicts
is the agency theory of democracy. This theory places the public in the role
of the principal,'65 with government as the public's agent.16 6 When govern-
ment trade secrets allow otherwise public information to remain hidden,
then the "central dilemma of delegation" is present: "[A]gents often do not
have common interests with their principals and . . . may have information
about the delegation that their principals lack."' While this does not always
lead to a failure in carrying out governmental duties in the public's inter-
est,'68 because trade secrecy has no strong theoretical basis for its very
existence in the government context, it is ultimately a needless risk to take.
161. Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government, Copyright and Copyright-Like Con-
trols over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1046 (1995) (citation
omitted).
162. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION BY FEDERAL AGENCIES: A POLICY OVERVIEW, H. R. REP. No. 99-560, at 36
(1986) (Conf. Rep.).
163. Id. (noting that proposals "to give the government copyright controls over infor-
mation have been made in the past and have been rejected by the Congress").
164. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 124 (2007).
165. The principal is the person who is delegating authority.
166. ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINs, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 79 (1998).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 79-81.
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From an agency perspective, trade secrecy stands in the way of another
principal benefit of transparency: to "reduce the monitoring costs borne by
the principals (voters) to ensure that their agents (lawmakers) pursue their
objectives."1 6 9 The ability of a government to claim a trade secret and there-
by prevent disclosure of information means that the public would have to
jump through legal hoops, by way of administrative appeals or litigation, to
have any chance of access to the undisclosed information. In the absence of
a clear theoretical basis for a government trade secret to exist, this is a cost
incurred with no meaningful benefit to the public or the law itself.
The problem of transaction costs indicates another significant impact of
the government trade secret. Even if the public is successful in accessing the
secret, by the time the information is made available, it may be too late. The
delays caused by appeals, both at the administrative and litigation levels,
may defeat the purpose of accessing the information. If a citizen wants to be
able to offer meaningful input on a decision not yet made by a public entity,
it needs real-time access to the information while options are being consid-
ered. By the time the decision is made, the value of any input that may have
been offered to impact that decision will be severely diminished. At that
point, the only option left may very well be to attempt to "throw the bums
out." As stated in the OMB Memorandum, "[t]imely publication of infor-
mation is an essential component of transparency."1 70 Thus, the existence of
a government trade secret can increase the transaction costs associated with
accountability.
IV. SOLUTIONS
I have discussed the basics of trade secrecy, its theoretical and practical
application, examples of its application in the government trade secret con-
text, its practical impact on transparency and accountability, its impact on
basic theories of democracy, and the potential benefits of government trade
secrets. Solutions to the problem can now be considered.
There are two basic principles upon which any solution must rest. The
first, as discussed in Parts I and III, is that the relevant stakeholder for gov-
ernment is the "diffuse public," and accountability and transparency are the
primary guiding principles.171 The second, as demonstrated in Part II, is that
information designated as trade secrets can be of public concern; trade se-
crets are not the exclusive interests of private parties.172
169. VERMEULE, supra note 160, at 196.
170. Orszag, supra note 7, at 2; see also Levine, supra note 9.
171. See Jody Freeman, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1303 (2003).
172. This is surprisingly not a settled point. See, e.g., Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements:
What You Don't Know Can Kill You!, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 257 (2004) (arguing that
"formulas or private issues" do not threaten "public health and safety").
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There are three possible solutions to the problem of government trade
secrets, each with pros and cons: (1) following the inspiration of Toledo
Blade and the CT Commission 73 and clarifying trade secrecy law generally
by redefining "trade secret" to unambiguously state that there is no such
thing as a government trade secret, thereby eliminating the theoretical trade
secrecy doctrine problems and practical transparency and accountability
problems at their root (the "No Government Trade Secrets Solution"),
(2) following federal FOIA and clarifying state freedom of information laws
to say that government trade secrets are not cognizable as an exemption to
FOIA requests but otherwise leaving trade secrecy law undisturbed (the
"FOIA Solution"), or (3) allowing the concept of government trade secrets
to exist but applying the narrower Public Citizen definition of a trade secret
in the freedom of information context and requiring that the government
show that it is directly competing in the private sector, as would be required
of an entity like PHEAA (the "Public Citizen Solution"). 7
1. The No Government Trade Secrets Solution
This solution, from a theoretical and practical standpoint, is the most
satisfying. By declaring that a government trade secret in any context is
little more than a legal fiction, trade secrecy theory and application are clari-
fied and transparency, accountability, and deliberative democracy are not
curtailed by trade secrecy. The need for litigation to establish whether the
subject information should be disclosed would be minimal since the issue of
trade secrecy would never come up, as the law would eliminate government
trade secrets. This would be particularly beneficial in contexts such as CPS
(example C) and San Diego (example D(1)), which seem to be egregious
examples of trade secrecy gone awry. Under this solution, the government
trade secret becomes a non-issue and courts would have a relatively simple
bright-line test to apply. This solution has the added benefit of not requiring
any specific change in freedom of information laws, to the extent that a
state's law has a trade secret exemption. Moreover, as trade secrecy is not
used by governments to bring misappropriation claims, there would be no
loss of relied-upon legal protection. Ultimately, more disclosure of public
information would result.
Of course, an obvious objection to this solution comes in the context of
PHEAA (example A). What do we do with the governmental entity that com-
petes in the private sector and claims that trade secrecy allows it to maintain a
competitive advantage? One solution would be for governments to find their
protection in patent law, as they currently can. 75 If a government agency
173. See supra notes 53, 78-82 and accompanying text.
174. Of course, a fourth choice is to do nothing at all, but t reject that out of hand.
175. See Tammy D'Amato, The Patent Scorecard 2009-Government Agencies, IN-
TELL. PRop. TODAY (October 2009), http://www.iptoday.com/articles2009-10-damato.
asp#.ftnI (noting that "government agencies do not patent heavily").
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really needs intellectual property protection, it could seek it in patent if it
meets the requirements of patentability.
At least from a theoretical standpoint, the idea of patents as the primary
substitute for trade secrecy has some appeal. In the present context, patent
law is a significantly more democratic doctrine from a transparency stand-
point than trade secrecy because of its public disclosure requirements and
limited duration of monopoly. A patent application, which usually becomes
public 18 months after filing,176 must "describe, enable, and set forth the
best mode for carrying out the invention,"177 thus providing substantial
public disclosure to anyone who wishes to understand the operations of the
invention. In relation to trade secrecy and its available injunctive relief, the
Ninth Circuit explained the appealing disclosure requirements of patent law:
The federal patent statutes require full disclosure of the invention as
a condition to the grant of monopoly so that at the end of the period
of monopoly the development may be freely available to all. Thus,
the federal patent statutes would seem to reflect a congressional de-
termination that any individual or social interests which may be
served by secrecy are outweighed by those served by full disclo-
sure.178
In contrast, while trade secrecy allows reverse engineering and independent
discovery (an often time intensive or impossible endeavor), trade secrecy by
its very definition abhors both transparency and public accountability.179
There is no such thing as "written description and enablement" made avail-
able to the public in trade secrecy, nor can there be. Thus, abandoning trade
secrecy in government and limiting protection to that which is patentable is
likely the right, if not perfect, answer.'s
176. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A)(2006).
177. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)). The "best mode" requirement, it should be noted, has been
significantly weakened and rendered almost meaningless as a result of the America Invents Act.
See Zahra Hayat et al., How the America Invents Act Will Change Patent Litigation, REUTERS
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/NewYork/Insight/201 1/1I_-
November/HowtheAmericaInventsActwill-changepatent_1itigation (noting that failing
to meet the best mode requirement is no longer a basis for patent invalidity).
178. Winston Research Corp. v. 3M Corp., 350 F.2d 134, 138 n.2 (9th Cir. 1965) (cita-
tion omitted).
179. See Secrecy, supra note 1, at 146-47 (discussing reverse engineering and inde-
pendent discovery).
180. It is important to recognize that commercial enterprises face real alternatives to
secrecy that are the subject of recent scholarly works. See HENRY CHESBROUGH ET AL.,
OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 170-74 (2006) (discussing Intel, Inc.'s
practice of publishing, rather than patenting, those inventions that they would "prefer to put
in the public domain" in an effort to benefit their business); see also Jim Chen, Biodiversity
and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MicH. ST. L. REV. 51, 79-81 (2005)
(discussing the public benefits of patent law over trade secrets, noting that trade secret law,
"by design, keeps information concealed [and] by contrast, [patent law is] designed to deliv-
er privately held information into public hands"). But see Dan L. Burk and Mark Lemley, Is
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Whether this solution would create the most profitable outcome for
governments is, for purposes of this argument, secondary to the fact that
transparency and accountability would be increased under such a system
and the theoretical morass in trade secrecy would be eliminated. But I do
not suggest that patents are purely democratic, that all patent applications
are thorough and complete, or that patent constitutes the perfect substi-
tute."' Clearly, there are certain ideas and processes that are better suited to
trade secrecy protection, and items like bid pricing may not be patentable in
the first place.'82 Nonetheless, the fact remains that trade secrecy law serves
interests that are anathema to basic values of transparency and accountabil-
ity, and the sacrifice of greater public accountability diminishes the
importance of the purely pecuniary advantages of trade secrecy.
Critically, the fact that trade secrecy has only been used by government
to prevent disclosure under freedom of information laws suggests that the
primary bases for trade secrecy-to encourage innovation or prevent misap-
propriation-are not major factors in the government's operations or use of
trade secrecy. Conversely, the textbook trade secret case involves one party
that is alleged to have misappropriated the trade secrets of another by one or
more bad acts. One would be hard pressed to find a case involving a free-
dom of information exception to trade secrecy in an intellectual property
or trade secrecy textbook. There is a good reason for this: protecting gov-
ernments from freedom of information requests is not a reason for trade
secrecy's existence.
Therefore, perhaps the best argument in support of the position that
governments do not need trade secrecy to serve the public is that the federal
government continues to serve the public and innovate in the absence of a
trade secrecy exemption to FOIA.1 3 It is doubtful that governments create
more or better goods and services because of trade secrecy. Entities that
might significantly benefit from having trade secrecy as an option to prevent
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1161-63 (2002) (noting
that Section 112 of the Patent Act imposes minimal disclosure requirements for software).
Patent law has been subject to much criticism in recent years for reasons ranging from the
overuse of patents in the computer software context to the amount of information that is
actually revealed in a patent application and is therefore not the perfect solution. See DAN L.
BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009)
(detailing various criticisms of patent law).
181. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 180 and accompanying text.
182. It is unclear how much of a difference there would be in terms of patentability in
the government context compared to the business context, since governments rarely seek
patent protection and have not brought trade secret misappropriation claims. See Wesley
Cohen, et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7552, 2000) (noting secrecy is generally emphasized over patents and lead time in the
development of new processes in certain industries). However, as business methods are cur-
rently patentable, it seems possible that some of PHEAA's undisclosed information might be
patentable. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 180.
183. Cohen et al., supra note 182, at 17-18.
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disclosure of valuable information, like the United States Army (which op-
erates power generating facilities through the Corps of Engineers)'84 as well
as the Departments of Energy and Health and Human Services, use patents
and operate without trade secrecy as an exemption to disclosure.i's The fed-
eral government's ability to function despite the lack of a trade secret FOIA
exemption suggests that states probably do not need this incentive either.
A fundamental reason why governments do not need trade secrecy is
that they have ample ways to prevent information from being disclosed to
the public aside from trade secrecy. It is important to emphasize that there
may be other legitimate reasons why information that might meet a defini-
tion of a trade secret should remain undisclosed. I take no position on any
other aspect of FOIA or state freedom of information laws. The existence of
national security and other FOIA and state freedom of information law ex-
emptions'86 remain unencumbered by this solution, meaning that
information that should not be disclosed for other reasons will not automati-
cally be disclosed by the elimination of a trade secret exemption.
Ultimately, my quarrel is solely with the concept of a government trade
secret because it is an illegitimate basis for non-disclosure. In the absence of
trade secrecy, it appears that all of the information denied public disclosure
in the discussed examples would have been disclosed because other exemp-
tions would have been inapplicable. Thus, it appears that the government
trade secret exemption to freedom of information laws is a last resort argu-
ment considering its limited case history, but a powerful exemption if
allowed. In sum, because government trade secrecy is theoretically unsound
and further muddies the theoretical underpinnings of trade secrecy, and has
a real impact on basic democratic values and the disclosure of otherwise
public information, this solution has significant advantages with only a hy-
pothetical risk to a governmental entity that competes with the private
sector, owns potential trade secrets, and cannot avail itself of patent protec-
tion.
2. FOIA Solution
The FOIA Solution is similar to the No Government Trade Secrets
Solution but with more downsides. Like the CT Commission approach, it
is a bright-line solution that eliminates the government trade secret ex-
emption to freedom of information laws, but does it in a more direct way.
Rather than addressing the problem from the trade secret law side, this
solution seems cleaner and perhaps easier to implement if the sole con-
cern is to make government more transparent and accountable. All of the
benefits of increased transparency and accountability created by the pre-
184. Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.
eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
185. See D'Amato, supra note 175.
186. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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vious solution would be created here as well. This solution also has the
benefit of having strong precedent behind it, namely FOIA and United
States Courts of Appeals decisions.
But the FOIA Solution leaves the theoretical morass in trade secrecy in-
tact and still has all of the PHEAA-scenario downsides discussed above.
Thus, as between the above and the FOIA Solution, both of which would
face significant political hurdles to their implementation, the better choice
seems to be the No Government Trade Secrets Solution since it addresses
trade secrecy and freedom of information law concerns with the same
PHEAA-scenario downsides. As I discuss more thoroughly below, however,
either of these solutions seems better than the Public Citizen Solution.
3. Public Citizen Solution
This solution attempts to address the problem in a way that marginally
increases transparency and accountability by allowing an entity like
PHEAA to have some diminished protection in trade secrecy. The Public
Citizen Solution approach focuses on the definition of a trade secret for pur-
poses of freedom of information laws. Rather than attempt to alter trade
secrecy doctrine in the purely commercial setting (where it is often quite
effective), a hybrid set of trade secrecy rules that recognizes the transparen-
cy and accountability aspects of democratic government might be preferred.
Thus, this solution has the benefit of defining the narrow circumstances in
which governments might properly assert trade secret rights.
Public Citizen defines a trade secret from a utilitarian perspective as "a
secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for
the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and
that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial ef-
fort."' This definition is certainly narrower than that of the UTSA'88 and
would force a governmental entity to specifically identify how the requested
information is, in fact, directly connected to their commercial efforts. It would
have the benefit of raising the standard for governments when they seek to
prevent disclosure of information by way of trade secrecy doctrine but prevent
broad assertion of a general government trade secret right.
But this definition leaves quite a bit of information secret that could be
of high public interest. New Zealand, which has extensive experience in this
area, has created a set of rules that the New Zealand Ombudsman considers
when the government seeks to deny disclosure of public records on the basis
of commercial confidentiality. In balancing disclosure against impact on
government, the Ombudsman weighs: (1) the particular market activity to
which the information is related, (2) the number of competitors, degree of
187. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280,
1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
188. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 14 U.L.A. 1(4) (1985).
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competition, and other characteristics of the market, (3) how information
claimed to be exempt is related to criteria upon which a government con-
tract is awarded, and (4) the degree to which disclosure would put a
competitor at an advantage.189 While still heavily focused on commercial
gain, this test has two primary strengths: (1) it forces the government to es-
tablish a clear connection between the information and its commercial
efforts and (2) it implicitly recognizes that there may be information for
which even commercial concerns are not significant enough to warrant de-
nial of disclosure. Although focused on government contracting, this test
could form the basis of a balancing test for government trade secret disclo-
sure generally with minor alterations (like eliminating the third factor
entirely). In tandem with the Public Citizen trade secret definition, this test
could be an attractive solution. Especially as there is a presumptive public
interest in government trade secrets that eclipses that in almost all other
trade secrets, courts should demand that a strong link to a government's
commercial interests exists before denying a fundamental democratic right.
Were this solution implemented, evidentiary issues would also have to
be addressed. A Canadian summary of such issues notes: "[a]s government
organizations increasingly embark on commercial ventures to generate rev-
enues . . . [m]ere assertions of commercial value or threat to competitive
position will not be sufficient to justify the exemption. Clear, direct evidence
is required." 90 At least in Canada, the issue has developed so that it is no
longer a question of whether government should have trade secrets, but ra-
ther of strength of evidence. A heightened standard that requires "clear,
direct evidence" to justify the exemption must be part of this solution, lest
the government engage in the same broad-brush designation of trade secrets
that has been one of the hallmarks of trade secrecy in the FOIA context
generally.191
Additionally, should this solution be implemented, the government
should automatically lose some of its rights to sovereign immunity, the
doctrine that prevents governments from being sued under a wide variety
of claims, or have that right severely curtailed. The government should be
specifically required to waive its right to sovereign immunity in any
commercial claims, especially torts that might be brought by a private
entity. In that way, the government would further level the playing field in
189. Paterson, supra note 18, at 327 (citing the New Zealand Ombudsman's Practice
Guidelines B4.2, § 9(2)(b)(ii)).
190. OFFICE OF THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., supra note 110, at 60-61.
191. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009 6 (2009), available at http://www.sigir.mil/
files/foia/2009/FOIA-AnnualReportFiscalYear2009.pdf ("Exemption 4 [from FOIA]: trade
secrets and other confidential business information").
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relation to its private competitors, a goal that has been long considered key
to government involvement in commerce.192
To further limit the impact of the continued existence of government
trade secrets on transparency and accountability, the duration of a govern-
ment trade secret could be limited. Rather than have a secret of potentially
infinite duration, like the Coca-Cola formula,' a government trade secret
could be protected for up to five years, at which time the trade secret
would be subject to public inspection. This alteration of trade secrecy law
in the government context would further recognize the public's interest in
government information, but allow the governmental entity to protect the
information especially during the research and development phase. Thus,
the protection would be for a reasonable and valuable amount of time.194
This solution does not address the theoretical problem in trade secrecy
generally, and leaves transparency and accountability largely subject to the
commercial interests of a governmental entity. These realities alone cause
me to reject this solution. Also, because it uses a multi-factor test, this
solution would create the possibility of much litigation because of the
difficulty of line drawing. For example, to the extent that we might con-
sider requiring a court to consider whether the subject information is a
"public concern" for purposes of whether it should be disclosed, Professor
Eugene Volokh has pointed out that courts have had a difficult time de-
termining what a "public concern" is for purposes of First Amendment
protection of disclosure of trade secrets by the press. Volokh has persua-
sively argued that the courts have consistently run into problems when
considering situations where the news media is sued for publishing a trade
secret leaked to it by someone in violation of their duty of confidentiality,
but without encouragement from the news media.' Therefore, a possible
solution of relying on the courts to simply allow dissemination of trade
secrets deemed a "public concern" would likely continue to run into the
same subjective judicial ad hoc decisions regarding where the line be-
tween a "public concern" justifying disclosure and a "private concern"
prohibiting disclosure should be drawn.196
192. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 162, at 59 ("[A]n agency that unavoid-
ably competes with the private sector ... must compete fairly.").
193. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
194. Even if this aspect of the solution were implemented, the public would still not be
able to give real-time input into government decisions, a major drawback of this solution
generally.
195. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REv. 698, 739-49 (2003); see also
Alex Eaton-Salners, Note, DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner: Freedom of Speech
and Trade Secrets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 282-83 (2004) (criticizing the decision of
the California Supreme Court because its "formulation and application of the public concern
doctrine was incorrect").
196. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has struggled with the definition of a
matter of "public concern" in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
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The Public Citizen Solution faces a similar fate of much litigation over
the balancing between public and commercial interests. Additionally, it
underscores the basic problem with governments depending on secrecy to
compete with the private sector. In fact, the problems with this solution are
perhaps the strongest argument for the proposition that governments should
not compete with the private sector at all if their ability to do so depends on
secrecy.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to gain further understanding of the utilitarian
underpinnings of trade secrecy and to identify the major conflicts between
government trade secrecy and transparency and accountability, with the
hope that state legislatures will address this problem. To be sure, none of
the proposed solutions, save doing away with government trade secrets,
are fully satisfactory, as they do not fully address the theoretical problems
in trade secrecy or harmonize the differing core values of commerce and
government. The proper goal is to have public transparency without coer-
cion and without having to resort to the regulatory or administrative
processes or to the courts. The goal should be the "presumption of open-
ness," and the Public Citizen Solution would have difficulty meeting that
democratic ideal. While the FOIA Solution comes closer, it still leaves trade
secrecy in a muddled state. Thus, the No Government Trade Secrets Solu-
tion, with its benefits to both trade secrecy and transparent and accountable
government, seems the most beneficial solution with the fewest downsides.
It bears acknowledging that the major upside, and arguably the only up-
side, of government trade secrets is their potential to allow some
governmental entities to maximize revenues and reduce costs. I am not un-
sympathetic to the importance of that goal, especially in a weak economy
where public services are being drastically cut, but is it worth the price paid
in muddling trade secrecy law and obscuring the operations of government
in a time where cynicism towards and suspicion of government is wide-
spread and getting worse? Especially where public and private interests are
increasingly blurred with commercial interests, defeating the interests of the
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (applying the "public concern" test
to a private plaintiff who alleged defamation based upon the defendant sending an errant
credit report to five subscribers and noting that "speech on public issues" is of primary con-
cern to the First Amendment). It seems reasonable to assume that the operation of a voting
machine and its impact on one's ability to cast a recorded vote would have to qualify as a
"public concern" under First Amendment analysis. However, PHEAA's marketing efforts
might be subject to more debate. Additionally, one would expect that an effort to define
whether the government is in "trade" as a basis for deciding whether subject information is
exempt from disclosure would face a similar litigious and muddied future notwithstanding
CT Commission's opinion.
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public at large,197 I conclude that it is not. The public, sensing that it knows
less and less about how political decisions are made, has developed a fun-
damental lack of trust and confidence in its elected and non-elected public
officials. At the same time, commercial interests generally are receiving in-
creasingly favored treatment in the law with limited meaningful public
discussion or debate. The No Government Trade Secrets Solution is not per-
fect, but it addresses a serious problem in trade secrecy law and transparent
and accountable government, and leaves a government entity with signifi-
cant, though fewer, options in intellectual property protection.
This Article leaves some questions unanswered. How widespread is the
use of government trade secrecy? How much information is being designat-
ed as trade secrets by government?"'8 The existence of the above examples
suggest that trade secrecy is exacting a significant cost to transparent gov-
ernment without necessarily creating any public benefit. If a speculative
market for a good, like the RCMP's CD-ROM, or a public school system's
blanket assertion that it cost a lot of money to create a test, like CPS's ar-
gument, can form the basis for an exemption from the public's right to
know, then we are confronting a very powerful tool of secrecy. Additionally,
the combined effect of increasing government commercial activity and
budgetary pressure makes it a safe bet that the use of trade secrecy by gov-
ernments will steadily increase.
The current climate of increased interest in transparent and accountable
government indicates that this is a good time to reassess the existence of
government trade secrets.199 Transparency has its forward-thinking ambi-
tions; witness the federal General Services Administration's 2009 plan to
release "a full database of all federal advisory committee members that can
be mashed up with lobbying records and contribution databases to show the
influence that resides on these important bodies."200 As Ellen Miller, Execu-
tive Director of the Sunlight Foundation, cautions, "we can similarly expect
Congress, states and municipal governments nationwide to feel pressure to
197. See Suzanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST.
J., July 31, 2009 (explaining that the "nine firms [identified in a report issued by the New
York State Attorney General as having paid $33 billion in bonuses in 2008] had combined
2008 losses of nearly $100 billion). This helped push the financial system to the brink, lead-
ing the government to inject $175 billion into the nine firms through its Troubled Asset
Relief Program." The situation was called "shocking and appalling" by Rep. Edolphus Towns
of New York. Id. On a lighter but nonetheless disturbing note, the mayor of Topeka, Kansas
recently issued a proclamation changing the name of Topeka to "Google" in an effort to lure
the Internet giant to build a fiber-optic broadband network in the city. Jessica Guynn, Topeka
Becomes Google, Kan., for a Month, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2010), http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/mar/03/business/la-fi-google-topeka3-201OmarO3.
198. These are questions reserved for answering in future research.
199. See, e.g., Morley Winograd and Michael Hais, MILLENNIAL MAKEOVER: MY
SPACE, YOUTUBE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49 (Rutgers University Press
2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
200. Miller, supra note 8.
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release information. That is, if the public demands it."20 1 While we are far
from the ideal deliberative democracy, given the largely anomalous exist-
ence of the government trade secret, now is the proper time to demand that
this theoretically unjustifiable concept with significant negative effects on
both trade secrecy law and transparent and accountable government be left
as a relic of the less transparent past. In an era where the sharing of useful
information and access to knowledge is technologically easier to achieve
than ever before in human history, the people should have access to their
trade secrets, or more precisely and accurately, their own information.
201. Id. The significant shortcomings in our current efforts to maintain a modern trans-
parent government are discussed in Levine, supra note 9.
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